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PREFACE
The first sixteen years of the history of Soviet/
Vatican relaticns represented one of the most profound
ideological and political struggles of the twentieth
century.

Two powers were, perhaps, never more antithe-

tical to one another than the Roman Catholic Church and
the Soviet Union.

The ramifications of the conflict

affected not only the Russian Roman Catholic communities, but also the attitudes of various Roman Catholic
communities throughout the world.

It seemed that,

wherever the specter of Communism loomed, the Church
underwent a time of trial.
In America, the press' analysis of this awkward
relationship greatly shaped opinion in virtually every
church.

It is fair to say that the ecumenical movement

in the United States grew because of the Soviet policy
of religious persecution.

Many American clergymen

equated the spread of Communism with the anti-Christ.
A host of American newspapers and periodicals kept
before the public the vision of a dangerous, atheistic
government bent on the destruction of the civilized
West.

iii

Wl:e.n exarnir. ing th.e American press' assessment.

of the Soviet/Vatican struggle, it is important to
look at both the religious and secular press.

The

questions this st~dy will r2ise include thr22 points.
Fi r st, how J. id the Arn~~r i can Catholic press '

COV(::r ;! g e

and analysis c f events compare to that of the American
secula~ p r ess?

Secondly, how accurate were both jnsti-

tutions in their facts and judgments?

Finally, what

cha.nges o c cnrred iti. American soci2ty l)ecatrne of the
O'I E:r ,3. l

l

CO 'V i~ r .3..qE! '?

Representing the American Catholic press,

thi~

study will use as its core three distinguished periodica 1 s : .f...rne r i ca ,

Cat 11 o 1 i c World , and Common we a 1 .

These

publications were significant because they reported
interndtional events and issues.
1-,l1e Vaticar1 ~

::3

They also p~ovided

'v'ie1jv·s 011 ·Cllt.1r:cl1/Si:.ate relatio11s.

Representing the American secular press, reports
fro 1~ per i o d i ca l dig 2 st .s , such a s I:!...i t er a r y Di_g es!:_ and
Each published art i cl2s concerning the struggle, and each offe=ed a
critical appraisal of events from various American a~d
European newspa p ers.

They also held a nationa1 circn .1.a--

tion.

Commentary from the American secular press will
· ~lso include assessmerits from Nation and The New Republic.
Source material from American newspapers will 1)e limited

iv

to three : tlw C1: i ca.go_ T :.d. bun e

I

the .San Francisco Chronicle.

have impo r-tan t
t

21. r

_y

Wi

1 ;_ b E:! l

a :3 pf~ct.2 for
j_ ml. t

the New York rr, j_ nH~ s , ctn d
These publications e~ch

thj_ s study, but their cornme!1 ·-

e d mOS t 1 y to the Petro gT ad Cat ho l i

C

2lergy trial of March 1923.
:S '7.: ca_n s e of

tr.~ E.~

l en gt h of

this stJ.6.y "'; .TJ..ll concentrate
1

(:.>L

t, i rn e

fro rn J. 9 l 7 to

}_ 9 3 3 ,

the seven events that

characterized the Soviet/Vatican conflict in the
Arneri.cc..n press,

These events include~ the two Russia~

revoluticrns of 1917, ths Genoa. confe-rence of 1922, the
Petrograd Catholic clergy trial in 1923, the Papal
famine re l ie f mission to Russia from 1921-1924, the

Vatican's prayer crusade in 1930, and the recognition
of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933.
Schc-la.rJ.y so:irc~es,

in English or in translation, will

be used tu cla r j_ fy e -•,ren ts that were left unreported or
poor J..y -3.ef ined.

As an overall guide to Soviet/Vatican

relations for this period, a copy of Hansjakob Stehle 1 s
Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917-1981 (1981)
recommended.
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CHAPTER I
THE MARCH REVOLUTION OF 1917
Far from being a central issue in the American
press' coverage of the first Russian revolution of
1917, the condition of religion was little reported.
This neglect was not a result of apathy.

Rather, it

resulted from the Russian Provisional Government's
proclamation of liberty of conscience and religion.
Most articles in the American press concentrated on
basically two questions when reviewing the religious
consequences of the revolution.

First, how would the

separation of Church and State affect the Russian
Orthodox Church, and secondly, what status would
minority religions have in post-tsarist Russia?
From March to November 1917, four articles appeared in the American secular press which assessed
the condition of religion in Russia.

The first ar-

ticle, published 12 May 1917 in the Literary Digest,
characterized the separation of Church and State in
Russia as a positive development.

Commentary provided

by Dr. William T. Ellis (1873-1950), a long-time resident of Petrograd and a reporter on religion for the
Boston Transcript, held that the rejuvena~ion of

2

both scholarly and socially conscious programs within
the Orthodox Church seemed assured.

To underscore his

assessment, Ellis called the Holy Synod's decision to
convoke a General Council and elect a patriarch an
"event of I)romising historical significance. 111
Further optimistic assessment on the revival of
the Russian Orthodox Church came from an article in the
Independent.
titled,

On 1 September 1917, it printed an article

"Russian Reformation. 112

It duly reported the

meeting of the General Council and the bishops' choice
of Metropolitan Tikhon of Moscow (1865-1925) as Patriarch.
The article approved the Council's choice and the status
as a El-" imus_ inter pares for Tikhon which made his condition similar to the Anglican and Lutheran Churches'
bishops.
Another article, appearing in Current Opinion,
offered some positive commentary, but :it also noted how
the previous August General Council of the Russian
Orthodox Chu r c h failed to provide a consensus.
-November 1917, the ar t icle titled,

In early .

"Russia Looking For

Spiritual Guida.nee," reported the overflowing crowds in
churches throu g hout Moscow.3

Because of the strains of

the Eastern Front war effort, noted the article, many
sought consolation in the churches.

The final analysis,

however, suggested a lack of spiritual

leadership.

3

The last article appearing in the American secular press also noted the Orthodox Church's leadership
void.

In the Review of Reviews, an article appeared

in November 191 7 titled,
Revolution. 114

"The Holy See And The Russian

Offering analysis from a French article

in the Revue de Paris by Charles Loiseau, the Review
of Reviews• suggestion concluded that the March revolution of 1917 in Russia created a favorable climate for
reunion between the Roman Catholic Church and the
various Slavic Greek Orthodox churches in Eastern
Europe.

The final analysis surmised that:

The Russians, Rumanians, and Serbs of the Greek
Church find their destinies linked with the great
Roman Catholic countries; and it may be presaged
that the bonds now formed in the various walks of
life will survive the war.5
Overall, the assessments given by the American
secular press detailed accurately events and issues on
the condition of religion in Russia.

The commentaries

reporting the status of minority religions in Russia
after the March revolution were uniform.

Jews, Moslems,

Protestants, and Roman Catholics were reportedly free
from the restrictive Russian civil authority.

Thus,

the American secular press portrayed the era of the
Provisional Government as a time when the policies of
religious discrimination and persecution had ended.

4

Unlike the enthusiastic reviews in the American
secular press, the American Protestant periodical,
Missionary Review of the World, offered a more cautious
assessment on the condition of religion in Russia.
From May to August 1917, it published three articles
with critical commentary.

Overall, it provided the

best understanding of an American periodical or journal
On the significance of the March revolution regarding
religious liberty.
In its first article titled,

"Russia on the

Threshold of -- What?," the commentary provided suggested
that the fluctuating military conditions on the Eastern
Front and the precarious existence of the Provisional
Government offered a poor environment for the growth of
Christianity in Russia.

Historically, noted the writer,

the Christian religion prospered in its infancy in a
large part due to the stable conditions of the Pax
Romana of the Roman Empire.

The volatile situation in

Russia, furthermore, favored not the traditions of
Christianity but rather revolutionary elements which
were mostly anti-clerical and atheistic.

Only political

stability and peace, concluded the writer, would aid
the strengt h ening of Christianity in Russia.6

The second article also came in the May 1917
i. SSUE~.

It offered ten pa.g2s of r.::vents in Russia from

March to May 1917.

Basically,

tiun of Church and Sta.t.1"2: .

It

it approved the separaa 1 so p ..r a. i s e d the ;:10 v e roe n t

to call a General Council in the Orthodo x Church for the

tion of the office of the patriarch.

Nevertheless, the

writer believed that there were se~ious obstacles tci
reJ. igious grcwth.

The Russian pec"..sa.nts, he ceincludc~d, we .r e illit::"!rate,

and their religious practices bordered on super-

stition.

Furtherrncre, the Orthodox clergy was inade-

qu ately trained,

and the higher ecclesiastics were

often lite.le more than civil bureaucrats.

a .l s ·o no :., c, l ~ =~ a j_ agenda

2

There was

n vi s i c- n. e d by the Cr tho d c x Church

when the revolution occurred, and many clergymen favored
-r~he re.turn of t r1 e Tsar_
religious reviv a l

Overall, noted the writer, a

in Russia woulJ be difficult to enact

if the Or thodo x clergy were re lied on to 2.ead it. 7

The one hope for a relig:i. cm,s :cev~:.val

caElG

t"rorn

fellow Protestant churches which cou ld se~d missionaries
to Russi a,

the ·writer corr.nr.en ted.

In deed , Baptists,

Methodists and Quakers already had members in the
American Red Cross Mi~sion in Russia.

With the declar-

ation of religio u s freedom granted by the Pro visional

6

Government, the writer concluded that these churches
· could expand their members to include proselytizing.B
The third and final article came in August 1917.
Titled,

"New Opportunities in Russia,

Ii

it offered a

more positi v e forecast on the revival of Christianity
after examining the Gene r al Council's convocation.
The writer believed that the replacement of many
Russian Orthodox bishops demonstrated a course toward
independence from the civil government's tutelage.
No longer acquiescent to rigid state control, the religious press also flourished.

The official organ of

the Holy Synod; The Ecclesiastical News, became transformed into a daily paper called The Ecclesiastical and
Social Messenger of All Russia.

In its renamed form,

the restrictive and narrow Orthodox tenets under Tsarism
gave way to religious debate.

The Orthodox Church, con-

eluded the writer, seemed prepared to lead itself by
consensus and not rely on the force of civil authority. 9
In summary, the articles in the American secular
press and in the Missionary Review of the World stated
that the separation of Church and State was beneficial.
The March revolution became a symbol in the American
press whereby the Orthodox Church was freed from civil
authority, and the toleration of other creeds began.
Jews, Moslems and Roman Catholics enjoyed freedom from

7

state sponsored persecution.

Undoubtedly, concluded

some com!nentators, American miss i onary activity wou l d
increase in Russia, notably among the Protestant churches .
'rhe Vatican I s view of the March revolution was
likewise optimistic but publicly more cautio1.;.s. The
New York Times printed the Holy See's official reaction
without commentary. 10

Ar t icles in the American Cathe.lie

piess provided substantial assessment on the Vatican's
attitude.

The two positive developments noted from

the revolution, offered in the American Catholic press'
analysis, were political and religious freedom.

First,

the fall of the Tsar and the separation of Church and
State meant that the regulation of the Roman Catholic
Ch urch by the Imperial Ministry of Heterodox Religions
·w as over.

Secondly, the Pope could name his own bishops,

restructure the dioceses and establish religious education programs.
The first article concerning the March revolution
appeared in the Jesuit periodical, America.
ial pul)lished on 14 April 191 7 titled,

An editor-

"Russia a..nd the

Imprisoned Archbishop," demanded the release of
Archbishop Andrew Sheptyckii

(1865-1944).

He was the

leader of the Uniat Church in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire with jurisdiction over the Ukraine.
commentary stated further that:

'l7he articles'

8

If the new Government in Russia 1s to com~nand ttu~
respect of the worl~, it must g~2nt to its peo9le
n~Yt msr-eJ.y civil indep£~ndence but tl:..e rlgLt to embrace and ~)ropagate the true reU. -:--J.icr1 (Roman Cat:.1·101-·
icisrn) " 11 .
.
The

f j __
r.st

dema.:1d the--: Provisi.onaJ. c~:ive:rnme-nt.

gra ~'. ted, and A..cchbi shop She~yt, ych: :'. i trav 2 l c~d. i rnm,~c: i a tel~t
1

~ft~r his release to Petrograd to org~niz2 an E~stern
rite church in Russia loy3l to Rome.
'w::1.s

c1lso

a-::-1s·1,\rc-~r.ed qu :t ckly.

?·Je 9 ct i a

The second demand

t i on E; b E~ t wt? c-.~ n th 1~

~')rcvisionaJ_ Governrne.:n t anci thG Roman Cathe.lie Ch1.2rc".::1.
actur3.dy beqc1.n in March 1917.

Bishop Edwdrd -~on der

Ropp (1851-1939) of Vilno and Auxiliary Bishop John
Cieplak (1857-1926) of Mogilev rep resented the Catholic
Church's interests.

A.long with 3everal other members

of th s Co mm i s s ion f or the Liq u i d at i on () f

th 0 Af f a i r s of

the Prcvisional. Government which permitted , amcng 0ther

thin;Js, th2 rigr1t to proselytiz2 in Russia.

1- :.,..-, - ,..,- o
,.J E. ,_ 0 J LlC:.

.... , .. ,. "' ·i cL-, .... .) .--,

t_. J 1...1. l.,

1

..L ....

1 , \:::. 'J.

.•

No I:. u n t j_ l

1~

Th<~ comrn:.=mta .ry also noted how the Ca. tbol i c

Sheptyckii

dS

the negotiator.

It appeare d in the ar-

ticle:s assessment that the Archbishop

1

2

release rneact

9

churches since these churches followed the same ancient
Greek ceremonies that Sheptyckii's Uniat Church usect. 13
The most knowledgeable Catholic spokesman on l,ne
-1-'

Eastern church~s was the Italian Agustinian priest,
the Reverend Aurelio Palmieri (1870-192~ .

He wrote an

article for the Catholic World, in August 1917, assessing
the impact of the March revolution on the expansion of
Catholicism.

Palmieri concluded that the greatest re-

ligious challenge from the revolution was that the
Russian intelligentsia was free from the rigid doctrines
of the Orthodox Church.
It was in this group, the intelligentsia, that
Palmieri noted a bitter anti-Christian attitude.

Be-

cause many of the political parties in Russia in 1917
were led by this atheistic intelligentsia, Palmieri
stated that the Roman Catholic Church needed to act
with circumspection in the anti-religious atmosphere.
He understood that the revolutionary character of the
v~rious Russi.an political parties meant that unencumbered religious freedom would not benignly follow the
March revolution.14
In September 1917, Palmieri wrote another article
for the Catholic World.

He seemed more optimistic and

noted that the convocation of the General Council of
the Orthod ox Church would help to fu r ther a dialogue
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between the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox hierarchy.
Reorganizing the Orthodox Church, Palmieri asserted,
He praised the Orthodox clergy

for con~enjng their General Council that August for
the first time in almost two hundrRd years.

In a purely

religious atmosphere, Palmieri concluded, the Vatican
had an opportunity to stress the common bonds of
Christian beliefs and practices between Russian Orthodoxy and ·Roman C~tholicism.15
Speculation on reunion also came from an article
in luner i ca on 1 September 191 7.
Nationalities,

11

Titled,

11

New Rtrnsian

the writer surveyed the various ethnic

groups in Russia likely to embrace Papal authority .

The

analysis held that Lithuanians, Poles and Ukrainians
would be receptive to the Vatican:s direction. 1 6
over, held the assessment,

the Ruthenians of the Uniat

. Church in the mcraine would benefit by SheptycJd i
lease.

More-

Th~oughout World War I,

I

s

re---

the persecution of the

Rut,hen i ans received wide cove.rage in the American
Catholic press. 17
was over,

In September 1917, their suffering

and they were valued assets for the Vatican's

plan to convert the Russian Orthodox.

In ccnclusion, the Amerj_can Catholic press examined the consequences for religion in Russia from the
March revolution and rendered~~ optimistic verdict.

ll

Appraisals on the condition of the Orthodox Church were
scund and i.nsightful.

Likewise assessme~ts on the pros-

pects for expanding Catholicism were also realisti.c.

As a.n · erudite scholar on Eastern Orthodoxy, Rev·.
provided e x cellent and informed commentary for

Palmier .i.

tbe

Arner:Lcan Catholic press.

In November 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized
p o wer,

an article in America called the act a usurpa-

tion of authority.

The appraisal depicted the Bolsheviks

as radical revolutionaries who would not last in power.

Their action, however,

placed religious liberty in a

precarious state, noted the commentary.
though,

Conclusively,

the article noted that collapse of the Bolshevik

government seemed certain.18
. As far as the second revolution in 1917, most
observers in the American press,

both secular and

Catholic, withheld their cammentary until a more stable
picture of civil order emerged in Russia.

Since vir-

tually no one predicted the possibility of a Bolshevik
revolution in 1917, there was little to report on the
probable consequences for religious freedom in Russia.
Not until February 1918, when Lenin proclaimed

1,-.,'

uJ.S

constitution, did the American press report the substance of the Bolsheviks' policy on religion.

CHAPTER II
THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION OF 1917
The American press' coverage of religious conditions under the Bolsheviks from November 1917 to
November 1921 was sporadic.

News from Russia was dif-

ficult to obtain, and an influential source, the growing Russian ~migr~ community in Riga and Warsaw, maintained little objectivity about the Bolsheviks .

The

~migr~s' stories of persecution were usually discarded
by American editors as too graphic.

Further complica-

tions on gathering information came from the lack of
American journalists in Petrograd.

This absence existed

because many foreign correspondents left Petrograd after
the Bolsheviks signed a peace treaty with the Germans at
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918.

Most American journalists

departed simply because their assignments were as war
correspondents, and Russia was no longer among the Allies
after March 1918.

Not until the American/Soviet negotia-

tions for a famine relief program in 1921 did Lenin's
government permit a dozen American journalists to enter
the Soviet Union.19
The lack of experienced reporters left the ensuing difficulties between the Bolsheviks

and religious

institutions largely unassessed in the American secular
12

}_3

Even Frazier Hunt, writing for the Chica9..2.

press.

Tribune, who remained in Petrograd until 23 March 1919,
failed to report the Bolshevi](s' policy en rel.iqion.
Most of the com~entary in the American press did note,
however,

that the official decrees and th 1?. F2brua.ry

1918 Constitution affected primarily the Russian
Orthodox Church.

What the Bolshevik dec r ees meant for

Catholics, Jews and Moslems rarely surfaced in the
American secular press.
On 2 March 1918, the Literary Digest published
an article which bemoaned the absence of reliable news
on the growing confrontation between the Bolsheviks and
the Orthodox clergy.

Its commentary noted that the

Russi an Patria r ch Tikhon r

farmer head of the R~rns ia.n

Church in America, opposed Lenin's decrees on religion.
The article als o reported from the Roches t er Pos t.- Ex pres..-'?..
newspaper that the Orthodox Church refused the sacraments
to Bolshevik government officials.

Furthermo re , th(~

Literary Digest article recounted the parallel of anticlericalism between the French revolution of 1789 and
the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 which wa s noted in the
San Antonio Light newspaper.

Finally, the article

carried an assessment offered by the Philadelphia
Inquirer newspaper that the Bolsheviks were "oppressive
and unjust" and that Lenin's government was "fatally

14

impolitic" against the Orthodox Church.20
Additional appraisal on the obscure transformation of religion in Russia came from Dr. William T.
Ellis reporting from Petrograd in April 1918.

He

wrote articles for the Boston Transcript newspaper.
The Literary Digest reprinted many of his articles in
its own national edition.

Ellis characterized the

Bolsheviks as secularized Russian Jews who were unable
to abate anti-Semitism caused by the speculation on
food in Petrograd.

He likewise portrayed the Orthodox

clergy in an unflattering manner when he depicted the
hierarchy as

11

ec9lesiastics rather than Prophets.

11

Ellis reproached them for remaining silent on the
social struggle.

Conclusively, he saw a polarization

of Church and State power.

His summation was that:

There exists a fundamental antagonism between
Bolshevism and ecclesiasticism.
Eminent leaders
of the (Russian Orthodox) Church are utterly
opposed to the new political leaders, and the
sentiment is heartily reciprocated.
There is no
cooperation for a common social or national goa1. 21
This antagonism became a state sponsored terror
against the Orthodox Church.

The American secular press

offered few details on the nature of the persecution.
In a letter dated 10 April 1919, Robert Crozier Long
writing for the New York Evening Post cited the failure
of the Orthodox Church to aid the peasants to get land.
The hierarchy including many leading bishops, he claimed,

gave no direction, and many of its members were charged
as counterrevolutionaries by the Bolsheviks~22
Further commentary in the American secular press
noted the West's failure to raise moral obje c tions to
the Bolsheviks persecution a cts that were kno wn .

On

13 December 1919, the Literary Digest carried a report
from the London Times newspaper written by Paul Dukes

(1889-1967) a long - time resident of Petrograd.
a r ticle titled,

" Going to Church in Russia,

11

His

t old

that the Bolshevik press ridiculed religious worship
as a superstitious practice.

Despite the flagrant

anti--religious campaign in the Bolshevik press, Dukes
noted that the Petrograd churches on Easter Sunday in

1919 overflowed with worshipers.

The popul a ce, t houg h

deprived of a vital Orthodox leade 1:-ship, clung to their
faith,

ascertained Dukes.23
By 1920, the American secular press no t ed that the

Bolshevik terror against the Orthodox clergy had its
~ffects.
7

An article titled ''Bolshevism Out to Abolish

God," from :the Literary Digest on 17 Janua..cy 1920, reported that Bolshevik demands for the end of the v erwration of relics was partially successful.

Many saints'

remains were examined and exposed as merely animal bon e s.
Religious icons, after scientific examination disproved
their authenticity, were destroyed.

The Bolsheviks

further converted larg-e Orthodox churches into museums

16

with anti-religious exhibits, thus hoping to sway the
masses away from the clergy's influence.24
Overall, the American secular press characterized
the Orthodox Church as an institution in turmoil.

The

clergy were the victims of the state sponsored persecution.

Charges of counterrevolutionary activity were

brought against the h~erarchy.

Its members were serious-

ly divided over the social struggle from the Bolshevik
revolution.

Conclusively, however, the American secular

press claimed that despite the terror and subjugation of
the Orthodox Church, the peasant masses retained their
faith. 25
The American Protestant periodical, the Missionary
Review of the World, had little difficulty in accusing
the Bolsheviks of persecution.

The commentary offered

noted that the social struggle was too vehement to allow
for a Church/State dialogue.

Conclusively, this period-

ical held that the Russian civil war would have to end
before the Bolsheviks and the Orthodox clergy could
create a modus yivendi. 26
Furthermore, the Missionary Review of the World
noted that few who opposed the Bolsheviks could escape
the charge of being a counterrevolutionary.

The hier-

archy clearly opposed the confiscation of Church property
and the abolishment of the clergy's stipends.

Although

17

some clergy reportedly offered compromise, most complained of the systematic destruction of churches and
the suppression of the religious press. 27
The American Catholic press characterized the
Bolshevik revolution in terms of both alarm and satisfaction.

These divergent assessments occurred as

Catholic commentators were repelled at the violence
done to the Orthodox Church, yet saw in this persecution an opportunity to expand Catholicism in Russia.
The destruction of the former state church left a void,
a void that the Vatican wished to fill by promoting the
cause of reunion with the Orthodox.

The first article

in the American Catholic press on Lenin's constitution
and its significance for religion in the Bolshevik controlled areas appeared in America an 16 February 1918.
The divergent assessments, alarm and satisfaction were
evident in the commentary.
The article noted that, although Lenin proclaimed
separation of Church and State, this act affected the
Orthodox Church.

Furthermore, eventhough ecclesiastical

property was nationalized, religious societies, reported
the article, continued tb use church property for services with the government's permission.

Charitable

orders continued theii work under the Commissioners of
Public Charities.

Salaries from the government, however,

18
would end for all clergy on 1 March 1918.

The article

depicted these acts as a blow to the Orthodox, but acts
mainly of economic necessity.28
By June 1918, another article published in
America reported on the calls for Allied intervention
in the Russian civil war.

The periodical's position

was that of the Vatican's, strict neutrality by the
Catholic Church.

The only interest for Catholics was

the revolt of the Czech troops along the Siberian railway.

The periodical supported the safe passage from

Russia for these Catholic Czech troops.29
Greater alarm appeared in September 1918 in an
article in America which concluded that the Bolsheviks
were merely German agents.

The basis for this claim

arose when the Committee of Public Information received
from its representative in Russia, Edgar Sisson, copies
of secret documents outlining Germany's support for the
Bolshevik cause.

The commentary assessed that Lenin and

Trotsky were German agents, that the Bolshevik revolution was financed by Germany, and that the Brest-Litovsk
treaty betrayed the Russian people.

Conclusively, the

article contended that the Bolsheviks were not a Russian
government but a German surrogate.30
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Further bleak predictions from the American
Catholic press came in another America article on 7
September 1918.

James Keeley, another representative

of the Committee on Public Information reported the
disastrous economic conditions in Russia.

He predicted

that the winter of 1918/1919 would make Russia "the
world's most awful graveyard. 11 _31

Moreover, as disaster

loomed, the masses turned toward religion to assuage
their grief.

In this instance, the article noted

Robert Crozier Long's appraisal from the New York
Evening Post that the religious revival the Bolsheviks
equated with nationalism.

The Catholic Church favored

strengthening this national sentiment among the Lithuanians, Poles and Ukrainians.

These groups became recep-

tive to Rome's authority which the Bolsheviks distrusted m
The very next month, October 1918, America published an article depicting the successful expansion of
Catholicism in Russia despite the turmoils there.

The

commentary noted that:
The Holy Father has appointed bishops for the six
dioces~s which the Czar suppressed.
The Titular
(bishop) of the new see of Minsk was recently consecrated at Warsaw and another bishopric will be
founded in Siberia.
The Ruthenians are reported to
be returning in throngs to the Church, and numberless Russians of all classes are becoming converts.
So, not withstanding the destitution brought upon
them by the suppr~ssion of endowments, the Catholic
clergy are full of confidence and enthusiasm.
The
Soviets' attitude toward religious authorities is
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said to be "consistently a.nd irreproachably correct, 11
a slightly preferential treatwent indeed being shown
the Catholic Church per11aps because the Orthodox
clergy are 2uspected of holding react ionar y opi~ions.
Corpus Christi, it is report ed , was publ icly celebrate d this year in Petrograd with great s p lendor.32

Th i s article's assessment occurred along with
.n-?ports c,f the Vatican I s iEtercession on b e h ;:.1. lf of the

Romanov family.

In August 1318,

Pe p e Benedi ct XV tele-

graphed bis NGncio in Warsaw, Achille Ratt~

(1857-1939)

wh o later became Pope Pius XI (reig·l1 1922--1939), in :::,rder
to re quest inforrnat i.on on the whereabouts of the~ fo rme r

Tsarina Alexandra and her four daughters, Olga, Tatiana,
Marie and Anastasia.

The Po) e believed that they made various appeals
for t heir release after the execution of the former Tsar,
Nicholas II.

Historians are uncertain cts to whether the

enti~e fami ly perishe' by firing squad, or wl.ether

Nicbolas II and his son wen=:::: tried o.nd executed Sc.:parateJ.y.
Bene cl .1 c t X'✓ be U . e ·.i e d at. the

t, i

me t hr1 t

t h r:.: for rnE:r Tsar i. n a

a nd ~er d au ghters were alive ~nd held ho s t Eg e ior a I)OSs .i. b1 (~ E.xc 110.n~~ 2

for \-;e rman Commun :i. s ts

:L rnpr i. s c n cd } y

·:.: 1. . 8

Kaiser in Early 1913.
An artic le appea:ted. ::..rr. August l 9i 8 in tJ:-1 e -~~~'~--Y~"Jr-1~

T.iI.t~~:..§.. t i t 1 E~ c1

i' Pope Wi 11

Ai. d Porn a no f f s

11
o
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The p 1 ,~ a e :x ·-·

p :cessed was s imp.lei thE:: Pope a.sJ~:ed the 3oviet g·ovecnment
to ~elea3e the ex-Tsar1~a a~d her f a mi y, ·a nd allow them

to l0av e Russi a.

The Soviets answered ~he Po pe's initial
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request hurriedly but politely.

Lenin himself had the

Soviet Foreign Ministry telegraph the Vatican tbat he
was unable to release the former Tsar's family because
he lacked adequate communication with the forces holding
34

The last article on the matter appeared in

them.
October.

A report titled, "Reds Evasive To Pope," stated

that news of a mob setting fire to the house where the
royal family resided could not be confirmed or denied.
In fact Lenin's government claimed no kno~ledge of even
the whereabouts of their prisoners.35
The outcome of this entire exchange was portrayed
as a public relations disaster for the Soviets in the
American secular press.

The American Catholic press

failed to comment on the Pope's effort.

In their last

communication to Benedict XV, the Soviets were rude and
uncooperative, hardly the image revealed in America's
judgement on the Soviets.

The Pope appeared as a magnan-

imous ruler nonetheless in the American secular press as
he offered asylum to his former political and religious
1

antagonists.

No doubt this good will gesture pleased the

growing numbers of Russian ~migr~s in Europe too.

Berlin,

Paris and Warsaw contained many exiles who vociferously
called for the West to overthrow Lenin's government.
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This encounter demonstrated the Vatican's initial
desire to contact the Soviets.

Further political develop-

ments from the November 1917 revolution required greater
Soviet/Vatican contact and communication.

On 20 April

1919, Edward van der Ropp was imprisoned by the Soviets.
As the Arcgbishop of Mogilev since November 1917, he was
the ecclesiastical head for the Roman Catholic Church in
Russia.

Lenin's government charged him with collabora-

tion with the Polish government.

His arrest coincided

with General Joseph Pilsudski's invasioh of the Soviet
Union in order to wrest control of disputed Belorussian
and Ukrainian territory.

After mass demonstrations in

Petrograd, the Soviets released Ropp who went into exile
at Warsaw.
That the American press carried none of this information while it occurred is disquieting.

The Vatican's

unofficial newspaper, Osservatore Romano, carried Ropp's
case, but the American journalists in Rome failed to
cable their home offices.

Even the veteran Vatican re-

porter, Thomas Morgan (1900-lg54) remained silent.
Overall, the Vatican's silence on the religious
difficulties in Russia was Benedict XV's policy.

He

hesitated to speak forcefully against the persecutions
of the Orthodox Church, because of the fluid situation
of Russian politics, and because of his concerns that

th e re mi ght be reprisals against Roman Catholics in

Sovj_ et held arE~as.

Thr2 onl.y ::1rticJ. .e i!1 the American

secular 1:).ress to print th~ P,'Jpe ~ s concern cam1::: in thi::!
New · Yo .. Jc 'l1i mes.

It

pub i i shed an n rt i c 1 e t i t l

E: d

,

.r

P,.s s

l~ ·:~--:,

· pc,pe Warned cf Bolshevist. Da.ng·er,a which rE~ported.ly

c2me in a. private cons.isto.ry of ca.rdinals.36 This mild
rebuke took aim mostly at the rise of socialism in Italy
with the Communist movement in EuropP Inf~ritic:n.e:d ct::: just
one of the dangerous political challenges to the Church's

By 1920 and 1921, the American Catholic preBs
offered only positive assessments for Catholic prcspects
i -y1

the Soviet Tfaion .,

An article in ZUJ.l~~t) ~-?- on 20 .AiJ.gust

1921, reflected the optimistic view.

'Yb.e comment.a ry

noted a re l ig ~ous void in Russia since the Soviet destru.ction of much of the Orthodox hie .r a _t~ch_y.

In tb:~s

voi d , epecul~ted the article , the m~sses might turn to
the leadership of the Catholic Church.
fiCclenia.stic.::i,
WA re

J 9-21 .

The two strong

Archbishop Sheptycki :i and Archbishop Ropp

quote<~ as believing that reunion had a ch?,r;.ce in
The only minor complication noted was the ques-

tion of which rite to use to attract Russian converts,
the Latin ri.t~-= or the~ Eastern rite. 37
In cO'rJ.clusion, the American Catholj. c press por-

trayed the Vatican as willing to contact and n2gotiate
on a limited basis with ·the Soviets.

·rhe excesses of
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religious persecution against the Orthodox were viewed
as tragic, but it was an area where the Catholic Church
could do little to intercede other than by lower diplomatic contacts.

Thus, from 1917 to 1921, the American

Catholic press depicted Catholics in Russia as unscathed
by the fury unleashed against the Orthodox Church.
It was significant that the American Catholic press
also noted that large numbers of Poles left Russia during
these years, thus removing millions of Catholics from
Soviet dominated territory.

The Baltic states also re-

ceived their independence, thus further diminshing the
numbers of the faithful under Petrograd's control.

It

was never mentioned directly in the American press, but
the remaining Catholics in the Volga region, Siberia and
the ancient Armenian Catholic Church in the Caucasus
were too widely scattered or unorganized to offer much
difficulty to Soviet authority.

They we~e portrayed

rather as groups of great potential for spreading the
faith.
The Vatican seemed prepared, by all accounts in the
American Catholic press in late 1921, to recognize the
Soviets.

They were the victors in the Russian civil war,

and had signed a treaty with Poland.

Thus, when the

European Allied powers called for an economic conference
at Genoa in the spring of 1922, the American Catholic
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press gave increasing commentary that a modus vivendi
between the Vatican and the Soviet Union was a distinct
possibility.

These predictions were sound, judging

from t h e knowledge that the Soviet/Vatican negotiations
over a Catholic famine relief mission were progressing.
The American Catholic press, however, failed to assess
the Soviet desire to erase all religion from the state.

CHAPTER III
THE GENOA CONFERENCE, 1922
The Genoa Conference occurred primarily for
economic reasons.

Europe remained seriously disabled

from World War I.

The Allied powers, especially

England and France, were eager to remedy the chaotic
market conditions and reestablish a stable currency
exchange system.

There were two important events

which took place during the formal discussions.
First, the Soviet Union made its debut as a member of
the European community when Lenin's government, the
victor in Russia's civil war, accepted an invitation
to send a delegation.

Secondly, the Weimar government

in Germany and the Soviets concluded diplomatic relations at Rapallo thus uniting the two outcast nations
of Europe.
From the viewpoint of the English and the French
governments, the alliance proved unsettling.

They came

to Genoa to press the Soviets for payment of the Tsarist
World War I debts and for some form of restitution on
the nationa li zed property confiscated by Lenin's government.

The pact proved further disquieting to the
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Allies because the Germans and the Soviets put aside
I

their claims against each other.

This agreement was

not the precedent the English and the French desired.
In the American secular press, the business community supported the plans of the English and the
French.

Many industrial and financial concerns de-

sired to establish plans for Allied payment of war
debts and restitution for nationalized property.
There was, however, no campaign to sponsor an American
delegation to represent the United States' claims.
President Warren G. Harding (1865-1923) remained aloof
from British entreaties to send a delegation.

Thus,

the American secular press had little to report concerning the United States'

involvement since no repre-

sentation was forthcoming.
One of the most noticeable consequences of the
Genoa Conference in the American secular press was the
improved image of Lenin's government.

Editorial opin-

ion approved of the appearance and style of the Soviet
1

Foreign Minfster, George Chicherin (1872-1936).

His

attention to etiquette made the Bolsheviks seem part
of the civilized West.

The ruthlessness and brutality

of the revolutionary days and the civil war became a
part of the Soviet Union's past.

The impre~sion
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Chicherin made with his cordial tone suggested that
the excesses of the Bolsheviks, especially their agitation for world revolution, were over.

As a result

of this improved image, . many American newspapers accepted the name Soviets over Bolsheviks and the Soviet
Union over Russia.

The acknowledgment of Lenin's vic-

tory became an accepted political fact, and the question of American recognition of the Soviets was raised
in the secular press.
Like the Soviets'

image, the American secular

press surveyed the Vatican's stance at Genoa.

Pope

Pius XI (1857-1939) sent a delegation with instruc-

tions to negotiate the legal status of the Roman
Catholic Church in the Soviet Union.

Unlike the

Soviets' decision to send a delegation, the Pope's
action received wide and unflattering comment in the
American secular press.
Accusations arose condemning the Vatican's
goals in the Soviet Union.

On 24 April 1922, an ar-

ticle publ~shed in The New York Times outlined the
Holy See's policy toward the Soviets.

The article's

conclusion held that Pope Pius XI desired to conclude
a concordat whereby the Vatican would recognize Lenin's
government in exchange for unhindered religious freedom
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for Roman Catholics in the Soviet Union.

Because the

Soviet/Vatican diplomatic contacts were conducted
secretly, The New York Times offered a speculative
analysis concerning the Vatican's motives for a con cordat.38
The reconciliation between the Russian Orthodox
Church and the Roman Catholic Church was the primary
goal of the Holy See, noted The New York Times' assessment.

The Soviets in return, for allowing Catholic and

Orthodox free association and possible union, would
gain prestige by having an ambassador from the Vatican
in Moscow.

Furthermore, a concordat between Moscow and

the Holy See would alter the attitude of the entire
Catholic body politic in Europe.

France, Germany,

Italy and Spain had large Marxist parties which vied
with Catholic Centrist parties for control of the government.

A treaty between the Soviets and the Church, held

The New York Times, would neutralize the influence of
these Catholic parties.
Altho~gh sound in its political judgements, the
article was inaccurate concerning the Vatican's religious
policy toward the Soviets.

For example, the newspaper

claimed that, when Pius XI was 'Archbishop of Poland', he
suppressed the 'Greek Orthodox Church' in the Belorussian
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and Ukrainian territories won by the Polish General,
Joseph Pilsudski (1867-1935), in 1921.

The article

further declared that the reconciliation movement,
between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman
Catholic Church, had momentum prior to 1917 among the
masses but that talk of reunion was quiescent in 1921.
As for the first assertion, there was never any
hierarchical position as the 'Archbishop of Poland.'
Achille Ratti's title was Papal Nuncio to Poland.

He

held the rank of an Archbishop, but the article misrepresented his jurisdiction.

As Nuncio, he restruc-

tured Poland's dioceses along territorial boundaries
which fluctuated rapidly after the conclusion of the
Versailles Treaty in 1919.

The suppression of the

Russian, not 'Greek', Orthodox Church in Poland's
Belorussian and Ukrainian territories came from
secular Polish authorities.

Religious coercion was

not part of Ratti's design.

The article also failed to

note that Ratti was no longer in Poland in 1921 when
General Pilsudski consolidated his claim on the
Belorussian and Ukrainian areas.
The timing of the second assertion in The New York
Times' article was also faulty.

The year 1917 was the

same year when many Orthodox converts freely joined the
Roman Catholic Church in Russia especially in Petrograd.
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Prior to 1917, Tsarist decrees made conversion a criminal act.

Only briefly in 1905, did the Russian Imper-

ial government permit conversion.

Approximately 200,000

people in the Ukraine changed their registration from
the state Russian Orthodox Church to the Uniat Church
loyal to Rome.39

This ~eemingly liberal policy was a

result of the 1905 revolution in Russia.

When Tsar

Nicholas II sufficiently regained control, he issued
subsequent decrees which rescinded the free conversion
policy.
The most penetrating analysis of the Vatican's
political motives offered in the American secular press
came from the New Republic, a progressive periodical.
The author of the article, M. Beilinson, criticized the
Holy See as an opportunistic power.

He assessed that

the collapse of Tsarist Russia radically changed the
political situation in Eastern Europe.

The end of the

Russian monarchy proved beneficial to the expansion of
Catholicism which Beilinson characterized derogatorily
1

as

11

Cathol:i,.c Imperialism."

Indeed, he saw that the

· weakened Russian Orthodox Church, the creation of a
Polish state, the post World War I freed6m of activity
in the Russian border states, especially in the three
Baltic countries, and the steady decline of the Greek
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Orthodox Church in Western Asia all represented opportunities for the Vatican.40
Diplomatically, Beilinson recounted the benefits
that the Vatican reaped from World War I suggesting that
the Catholic Church gained from the conflict unwarranted
concessions.

France signed an agreement with the Holy

See, and the Italians negotiated a concordat.

The

British had a representative at the Vatican, and the
London government supported the Pope's interests at the
Genoa Conference.

As these negotiations between the

Holy See and the various secular European governments
progressed, the Vatican clarified and strengthened the
Roman Catholic Church's legal status.
Despite Beilinson's criticisms, he grudgingly admired the Vatican's diplomatic timing.

He described

Pope Benedict XV (reign 1914-1922) as a master of diplomacy who chose wisely not to compromise the Catholic
Church during the Russian civil war by making contact
with the various White Guard factions.

The one enticing

opportunity to expand Catholicism arose, noted Beilinson,
when the Petliura government in the Ukraine, which existed
briefly in 1919, sent an embassy to the Pope.

Benedict XV

responded by sending to the Ukraine a Catholic mission,
but before it reached the country, the Bolshevik army reoccupied the territory.

The Vatican mission halted in
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Poland and eventually returned to Rome.
Concerning the Vatican i s intentions at Genoa,
Beilinson believed that the rumors of negotiations for
a concordat between the Holy See and the Kremlin were
true.

He declared that Pope Pius XI's attitude revealed

a great deal in this matter.

Beilinson noted that en

7 April 1922, Pius XI sent an open letter to Archbishop
Signori of Genoa wishing the conference success.
received mention in the letter.

Russia

On 29 April 1922, Pope

Pius XI sent a second letter this time to Cardinal
Gaspar r i

(1852-1934) the Vatican Secretary of State from

1 3 October 1914 to 7 February 1930.

Gasparri was the

architect beh in d many of the Vatican's concordats, th u s
Beilinson noted that important terms must have arisen.
In t his second letter, however,

the Pope lamented that n o

immediate results came from Genoa.

Mgr. Giuseppe Pi zzar do

( 1877-1970) went to Genoa on the . Vatican's behalf with the
Chu rch 1 s property claims against the Soviets, but t he
Allies informed him that they ha d already negotiated the
return of toreign property without results.
Beilinson's assessment was sound because the
Vatican and the Soviets h~d concluded an agreement a t
Genoa.

Cardinal Gasparri and the Soviet representative

to Italy, Vaclav Vorovski

(1871-1923), who was murdered
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10 May 1923 in Lausanne, Switzerland by a counterrevolutionary, concluded a pact limited to approving the Papal
Famine Relief Mission to Russia.

The Osservatore Romano,

the Vatican's unofficial newspaper, confirmed this agreement, but the document was not published until Hansjakob
Stehle (1927-

), a West German scholar and journalist,

printed the text in one of his appendices in his first
German edition in 1977 in a study detailing the Eastern
diplomacy of the Vatican.
Although the agreement concerned only humanitarian
aid by the Vatican, Beilinson maintained that the agreement represented an entente cordiale between the Holy
See and the Soviets.

His overall appraisal on the nego-

tiations was harsh on both the Soviets and the Vatican.
He viewed both powers as exploiters who wished to gain at
the expense of the weakened Russian Orthodox Church.

The

very fact that Beilinson referred to the Holy See as the
'Black International' and to the Soviets as the 'Red
International'

in the article's title revealed his distaste

• for both powers.
The questions, who was M. Beilinson and what were
his or her qualifications when commenting on the Soviet/
Vatican struggle, have yet to be answered.

Although bio-

graphical material, especially education and journalism

35
experience are unknown, the reporting of events was
accurate in the article.

Furthermore, the tone of the

article represented a mild form of anti-Catholic sentiment which prevailed . in the American secular press during the 192O's.

Beilinson's conclusions on the Soviets'

and the Holy See's motives were skeptical because the
author did not subscribe to either's claim that they
represented some form of ultimate religious or scientific
truth.

Thus,

Beilinson presented in the article a fairly

common theme in the American secular press, namely, that
both powers sought a worldwide following based on exclusiveness.
A defense for the Vatican's negotiating with the
Soviets at Genoa appeared in the American Catholic press.
The Reverend Aurelio Palmieri defined the Holy See's
policy in an article for the Catholic World.

The reasons

for Benedict XV's and Pius XI's contacts with the Soviets,
stated Palmieri, were numerous.

He admitted to Catholic

plans for expansion in the Soviet Union, but he characterized it as "fruitful apostleship" rather than as imperialism.

Moreover, he maintained that, when Pius XI

took office in February 1922, the Pope wished to extend
to the Russian Orthodox the idea of ecclesiastical unity.
The schism between Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic
need last no longer with Tsarism gone. 41
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Furthermore, Palmieri portrayed the Vatican's
activities on behalf of the Orthodox Russians since the
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 as sincere efforts.

Indeed,

Benedict XV acknowledged the persecution of the Russian
Orthodox clergy, and he interceded with the Soviets on
their behalf.
emigres.

He also collected funds for Russian

Pope Pius XI continued his predecessor's work

and expanded it.
Pius XI continued Benedict XV's plan to send a
relief mission to the Soviet Union as part of the international effort to end the famine.

He also meant to ex-

pand the scope of the mission to include the Volga region.
Despite these charitable works, the emigre . press in
Europe disavowed the Vatican's rapprochement with the
Soviets.

Some Russian emigres claimed, like Beilinson,

that Pius XI aimed to take advantage of the Soviets' persecution of the Orthodox Church.

Specifically, the emi-

gres press accused the Vatican of seeking to extend its
authority by sending Jesuits into Russia with food while
7

proselytizing among the Orthodox.
The various charges raised by the emigre PFess
Palmieri refuted on a case by case basis.

The noted

Russian novelist and literary critic Demetrius Merezhovski
(1865-1941) printed one of the first articles in the
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European ~migr~s press attacking the Vatican's negotiations with the Soviets.

In the Russian ~migr~s

paper in Paris, Poslednie Novosti, Merezhovski noted:
the reunion of churches has long since been the
yearning of the prophetic spirits of Russia ...
The universal pastor, the one flock - this is our
hope, our faith, our love ... but this reunion
could not take place if the Vatican made a concordat with the international gang who call themselves
the Soviets of Russia.42
In Berlin, the reaction of the Russian ~migr~
press was similar to the reaction in Paris.

An article

in Rulon 14 May 1922 stated:
the Vatican hopes by condescension to pave the way
to the reunion of churches.
The Vatican hopes to
quench the thirst for faith of Russian souls, but
that thirst cannot be guenched by any agreement
with the persecutors.43
The Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia likewise resented the Vatican's policy of reconciliation with the
Soviets.

On 1 June 1922, an article appeared in Samou-

prava, the official organ of the Serbian Church. It
concluded:
that by means of a treaty stipulated between the
Holy See and the Soviets, the Pope and the Jesuits
have conquered an unlimited right to spread Catholicism ~ithin Bolshevist Russia, and to increase the
influence of the Roman Church.44
The article continued with the news that the
Serbian Patriarch and his hierarchy protested what they
saw as a Catholic invasion of Russia.

They issued an
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appeal to the Patriarch of Constantinople (Istanbul).
Their final statement claimed that the 'corrupted' West
had no right in the East.
the European emigre
the Balkan.

The last article appearing in

press was in another Serbian paper,

It charged that the ''alleged concordat be-

tween the Holy See and Bolshevism is the greatest shame
of the twentieth century 11 .45
Because of this religious indignation in Europe,
which the American secular press failed to comment upon,
Palmieri offered an analysis of the Vatican's policies
in order to mitigate the criticisms of the Russian emigres press and the Eastern Orthodox Churches.

His anal-

ysis was essential for the American Catholic press since
the Holy See looked to the Catholic Church in the United
States to provide funding for the Papal Famine Relief
Mission to the Soviet Union.

Unclarified intentions

might leave Pius XI's designs at the mercy of his critics.
Palmieri began by noting that all Popes of the
modern age followed a conservative and patient policy
toward civil authorities.

The Vatican was not unaffected

by political changes, but the turmoils of nations would
never change Church dogma.

The hierarchical Church lived

in close contact with secular authority, but it did not
follow its vicissitudes.

In no way, Palmieri reminded
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his American audience, would the Roman Catholic Church
depend on the political conditions of society to maintain its existence.
Moreover, Palmieri noted that while the Church
remained independent of any political regime, exigencies
of the hour made for necessary, and at times, sporadic
relations.

Conclusively, he held that the Church cannot

make war upon political regimes which assumed power by
violence.

The Church may condemn them, but it retained

the right to ask of them the necessary guarantees for the
faithful.

Thus, for the Vatican to negotiate with the

Soviets, in order to mitigate some of the persecution of
the faithful, was within the realm of its traditional
jurisdiction.

Palmieri concluded that reports of a

formal concordat were premature.

Too many political

observers, he wrote, wanted to find a second Rapallo
this time at the Vatican's expense.
Comparing Palmieri's analysis to Beilinson's and
The New York Times', it is clear that the American secular press failed to note that, at Genoa, Pius XI continued Benedict XV's policy in regards to the Soviet Union.
Although Pius XI appeared to chart a new policy, by dismissing the d efunct Provisional Government's charg~
d'affaires to the Vatican, Nicholas Boch (died 1962),
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Benedict XV had already decided this action.

Pius XI'S

desire to use food to win converts was also a continuation of the former Pope's policy which the American
secular press failed to report.
Furthermore, the American secular press speculated
that the Vatican and the Soviets, while at Genoa, were
concluding a rapprochement because of the gains each saw
in the famine.

Reports appeared declaring that formal

Vatican recognition of the Soviet government was imminent.
Palmieri's lone voice in the American Catholic press
warned that such judgments were incorrect, and that the
Soviets' religious policy required significant Vatican
concessions, concessions never historically granted to
any secular government.
Owing to the impressions on Genoa offered in the
American secular press, many Americans were unprepared to
grasp the Soviet perspective, or the Vatican's, when the
show trial of the Roman Catholic clergy from Petrograd
convened in Moscow in March 1923.
1

As far as the American

secular pr~ss was concerned, the aftermath of Genoa meant
acceptance if not recognition of the Soviet Union by the
Holy See.

The clash of wills in the 1923 show trial

came as a comp lete reversal of the American secular press'
assessment on the significance of the Soviet/Vatican
agreement at the Genoa Conference.

CHAPTER IV
THE CATHOLIC CLERGY TRIAL, 1923
A comparison between the American secular press'
coverage of the March 1923 Petrograd Catholic clergy
trial and the American Catholic press' coverage reveals
both similarities and differences.

The consensus sup-

ported overwhelmingly by both institutions suggested
that the Soviets aimed to persecute first the small
Russian Roman Catholic Church, and then attack the
larger Orthodox Church.

A few voices, however, in the

American secular press, dissented.

They examined the

Soviets' policy to make the Catholic clergy conform to
civil decrees, and they saw no undue persecution.
Their conclusions favored the sovereignty of Lenin's
government against the prerogatives of the Roman Church.
Whatever side one supported, Soviet or the Catholic
Church, the accuracy of trial reports and subsequent
coverage on worldwide reaction was sound in the American
press.

Both the secular and Catholic press printed eye-

witness accounts of the five day trial conducted from
21 March to 26.

Both also followed international reac-

tion and reported it accurately.

From the tone and

length of the coverage, it became clear tha~ important
ramifications loomed.
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Of the seven events characterizing the Soviet/
Vatican struggle in the American press, this trial held
the most significance.

When the Soviets issued the

death sentence against some of the clergy, and when they
executed Monsignor Constantine Budkiewicz (1867-1923) a
canon at Saint Catherine's in Petrograd, the focus in
the American press assessed the Soviets' religious
policy more closely than when the Soviets were persecuting the Orthodox Church.

Underlying tensions were

reviewd, revealing a besieged Russian Roman Catholic
Church.

No longer, as in 1921, did any writer suggest

in the American press that the Catholic Church was
relatively safe from the Soviets' drive against organized religion.
One of the unique consequences in American reaction was the strengthening of ecumenism.

Protestant

and Jewish leaders joined in common cause with the
Roman Catholic Church because they too shared the legacy
of Soviet persecution.

Indeed, the unity against the

, Communist movement crystalized in virtually every
American church.

Also, due in part to this professed

antagonism, the American r~ligious community helped delay
the United St a tes' recognition of the Soviet Union by ten
years.

While Catholic European countries recognized the

Soviets, American politicians adhered to the views of
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the religious community and withheld recognition.
Thus, the trial had a negative impact on American/
Soviet relations owing in large part to the reaction
of the churches.
In the American secular press, the trial _proceedings appeared in several eyewitness accounts.
Francis McCullagh (1874-19~6), a journalist for the
New York Herald, published his account on 6 April 1923
which many American newspapers carried.

As an Irish-

Roman Catholic, who served in Russia during the Allied
intervention as a British officer, and who was a prisoner
of Bolshevik forces in Siberia in 1920, McCullagh excoriated the Soviets for conducting the trial.

He consid-

ered the proceedings sacrilegious and a case of religious
persecution.

He correctly blamed Gregory Zinoviev (1883-

1936) as the man behind the trial.
Zinoviev was the Party chairman in Petrograd, and
he wanted the reluctant Catholic Church to conform with
the Soviet decrees on religion.

Mccullagh berated his

forcefulness as well as the behavior of the three Soviet
judges and the public prosecutor, Nicholas Krylenko
(188501938).

Despite his ipparent outrage, Mccullagh

reported the trial accurately and cited articles in
Izvestia and Pravda and compared them with trial testimany.

He lost his status as a journalist after the trial,
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however, because of the Soviet threat to deport all
American reporters if his credentials were not revoked.
Another eyewitness account in the American secu lar press came from the news service of the National
Catholic Welfare Council on 21 May 1923.

Reverend

Edmund Walsh (1885-1956), the American Jesuit priest
selected by Pope Pius XI to head the Papal famine relief
mission to the Soviet Union, wrote the report.

Along

with Mccullagh, Walsh, as the Papal representative, sat
in the court room from the trial's first day to its
close.

His account appeared in the New York Times on

27 May 1923. 46

Like McCullagh's account, Walsh also

ridiculed Krylenko's style, claiming he was 'bloodthirsty'

and 'inhuman.'

These two accounts supported

a survey of American newspaper editorials which revealed
that the show trial failed to win sympathy for the
Soviets.

The trial was portrayed as an attack on re -

ligious freedom and not as a demonstration of the
Soviets' sovereign right to regulate religious bodies
in accordance with civil law.
Two newspapers with a substantial circulation,
the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune, had foreign
correspondents in Moscow during the trial.

Walter

Duranty (1884-1957), a noted English journalist and
World War I correspondent, served as the New York Times'
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reporter in the Soviet Union.

His initial reports

underestimated the impact the trial would create.
Duranty, an admirer of the Communist movement, believed
at the beginning of the trial that the Soviets would be
lenient and would not issue any death sentences.47

He

reported that only 150 people attended the court's
first session; thus, the proceedi~g was likely to prove
routine.

The execution of Mgr. Budkiewicz and the mount-

ing world reaction, however, changed Duranty's sporadic
coverage.

Overall, the New York Times published five

editorials on the trial, each favoring the Petrograd
clergy.
George Seldes (1890-

), an American citizen

with Russian parents, was a foreign correspondent for
the Chicago Tribune.

Unlike Duranty, Seldes felt that

the p6litical ramifications from the trial would be
significant.

He cabled articles from 22 March to 4

April 1923 on the trial.

Seldes succeeded in conducting

the only published interview with Edmund Walsh.

The

American priest reminded Seldes that the generous
famine relief collections from Catholic Americans,
totaling more than four million dollars, would likely
end if the Soviets executed any of the Petrograd clergy.48
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Both these journalists took a personal interest
in the trial and conferred with Soviet officials and
foreign ambassadors.

Seldes offered a solution to

free the clergy by exchanging them for Communists held
in Italian jails.49

Likewise, Duranty had made a pro-

posal to the German ambassador in Moscow to free the
clergy, once the death sentences were issued against
Archbishop Cieplak and Mgr. Budkiewicz, but similar to
Seldes' plan it too failed.SO
The San Francisco Chronicle published articles
on the trial from 23 March to 7 April 1923.

Reports

in this newspaper stated that Archbishop Cieplak's
testimony revealed that Pope Pius XI would allow the
Petrograd clergy to sign an agreement with the Soviet
government regarding the utilization of church buildings
and other properties. 51

The paper reported that

Krylenko dismissed the Vatican's compromise because
what the Soviets considered important was not last
minute compromise but obedience to Soviet law.

The

theme stressed was that the American sense of justice
was opposite the Soviet sense of justice.
Krylenko's statement on why the Soviets acted in
this fashion appeared only in the Soviet press.

The

San Francisco Chronicle concentrated rather on Krylenko's
temper and verbal abuse of the clergy which was all part
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of a show trial.

Many American newspapers also failed

to comprehend the Soviet theatrics, and the three
editorials published by the San Francisco Chronicle
on the trial depicted the Soviets in the lowest terms.
The outcry in this newspaper was not that unusual since
the city of San Francisco supported various Russian
refugee groups all united in their stand against the
Soviet government.
Despite the overwhelming support for the Petrograd
clergy in most secular American newspapers, editorials
favoring the Soviets appeared.

The St. Louis Post-

Dispatch published five editorials on the trial, three
of which were highly favorable of the Soviets.

These

three editorials also criticized the Petrograd clergy
which was atypical, but significantly the criticism
came before the announcement of Mgr. Budkiewicz's execution on 4 April 1923.
One of the editorials favoring the Soviets discounted the belief that the priests were tried because
of their status as clergymen.

The writer suggested that

rather they were guilty of treason since they admitted
to having communications with Polish authorities during
the Polish/Soviet war of 1919-1921.

Furthermore, since

the clergy all held Sovi~t citizenship, the writer noted
. . 1 1 aws. 52
that they must obey the c1v1
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Another editorial appeared in the Post-Dispatch
which condemned the habits and privileges of Russian
clergymen.

The writer identified himself as a former

Russian citizen.

The editorial content, however, was

flawed and misleading.

The writer claimed that the

Petrograd clergy deserved their sentences because of
their past injustices against the Russian people.

These

clergymen, the writer held, were guilty of supporting
race riots against the Hebrews.

While it was true that

the Jews suffered in the pogroms, the actual persecutors
were the Tsars and the Orthodox Church.

The writer

failed to note that the Roman Catholic clergy never held
a leading role in Russian society.53
The writer further claimed that the Petrograd
clergy owned too many valuable tracts of land.

Concern-

ing the Catholic estates, however, the writer failed to
note that the Tsars confiscated most of these properties
during the nineteenth century.

Finally, the writer

accused the priests of trying to overthrow the Soviet
government . by inciting the masses.

The writer of this

editorial confused the highly visible Orthodox clergy
with the small and insignificant Roman Catholic clergy
in Russia.

No distinction appeared between the two in

the writer's analysis.

The editorial opinion did not

correspond to the condition or the role of the Catholic
Church in Russia since the November 1917 revolution.
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A more concise defense for the Soviets appeared
in the Post-Dispatch on 4 April 1923 on page eighteen.
The writer of this editorial urged that the policy of
self-determination be given a chance in the Soviet
Union.

He noted that President Wilson's fourteen points

provided for self-determination, and the writer saw no
reason, not even the trial, to change American policy.
As far as the trial went, the writer believed that the
Soviets were justified in trying the priests especially
since both leading clergymen, Archbishop Cieplak and
Mgr. Budkiewicz, were Soviet citizens.

The writer sur-

mised that they knowingly and willingly disregarded
Soviet decrees because they were inconsistent with the
Church's canon law.

Hence, their trial and sentences

were based on their defiance of the civil law.

The

writer summarized his view of the Soviets by concluding:
Unless you are ready to say that Russia has not the
right to govern herself, and that she should allow
the rest of the world to pass on her laws, then I
can't see any justification for official interference in the clerical cases.
We know that the
Russians disapprove of our government, but we
certainly don't intend to change it on that account,
do we? Then why should we expect Russia to change
hers on our account?54
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Most commentary in the American secular press
favored the clergymen, and many writers noted the
unusual unity of faiths against the Soviets' show
trial system.

After the March trial of the Petrograd
.
clergy, Zinoviev ordered the former Patriarch,
Tikhon of the Orthodox Church, to stand trial that
April.

The existence of religious institutions in

the Soviet Union appeared doomed unless clergymen
conformed to the government's secular decrees.

The

1918 Soviet constitution granting separation of
Church and State and the freedom of religious worship
appeared meaningless i.n the American press.

What

the American press overwhelmingly described during
these show trials was a direct attack on religious
organizations.55
What characterized this assault, noted many
commentators, was the Soviet desire to end the influence of religion.

The government banned Soviet

officials from attending church functions.

Those

workers who identified themselves as believers became second class citizens.

They were discriminated

against in employment, housing and schooling.

Food

rationing in Soviet cities, moreover, went according
to who was an atheist and who was not. 56
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There was some resistance within Russia to the
Soviets' persecutions and trials, but their was little
unity of the faiths as there was in America.

The

Orthodox Church was divided, some clergymen wanted their
former leader Tikhon to acquiesce to Soviet demands,
some wanted him defrocked, and some called for further
resistance.

Similarly, the Russian Catholics lacked

leadership.

Archbishop Ropp was in exile in Poland,

Archbishop Cieplak was in a Moscow jail, and all the
Catholic episcopal sees in Russia by the end of 1923
lacked a bishop due to their exile or imprisonment.
Russian Protestant churches, however, such as the
Methodists and Quakers had already signed agreements
with the Soviets.

Russian Jews likewise wanted little

publicity and tried to accommodate themselves with the
Soviet decrees.57
The most thorough analysis of the Soviet designs
against religion came from Louis Fischer (1896-1970) an
American journalist sympathetic to the Communist movement.
tical.

He found the unity of faiths in America hypocriAnti-Semitism was part of the Roman Catholic

Church's unofficial credo, noted Fischer.

The Eastern

Orthodox ~migr~s clergy likewise were against Jews because they believed that many Soviets were ethnic Jews
intent on destroying the Orthodox Church.
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What Fischer tried to demonstrate in his assessment was that the Soviet show trial system, although
flawed by Western standards, was a means of social
struggle.

The Soviets wanted to end the dominance of

the hierarchy of all churches in their state.

They

selected the Catholics first for a trial because they
were a small group, and because they were most adamant
in their opposition to the Soviet system.

The Soviets

failed to assess, noted Fischer, that the Catholic clergy
had a worldwide following that would support its struggle.
The more significant objective Fischer noted in the
Soviet persecution of religion was the destruction of
the Orthodox Church.

In this case, the Soviets wanted

to lead the masses away from the church, thus furthering
the class struggle and eventually equalizing all citizens.
Fischer summarized that the Soviets failed to ascertain
worldwide reaction to their designs in the show trials of
1923. 58
Unlike Fischer's apologia, the American Catholic
press excoriated the Soviets' show trial of the Petrograd
clergy.

Citing the Soviet constitution of 1918 granting

religious freedom, an article in the Catholic World in
April 1923 lambasted the Soviet claims of religious
tolerance. 59

Furthermore, after the execution of Mgr.

Budkiewicz, the Catholic press recounted what it saw as

53
the martyrdom of the Catholic clergy since the November
1917 revolution.

After misleading articles expressing

only the best of hopes for the expansion of Catholicism
in the Soviet Union, the terrible truth was published.
Russia lacked a Catholic hierarchy.

The Soviets had

deliberately exiled, imprisoned or murdered Catholic
clergymen for their refusal to surrender church property.
Catholic churches were closed by government decree.
Divine worship was all but impossible; large groups at
mass were prohibited.

Perhaps the final insult was

that the Vatican's relief efforts during the famine
failed to mitigate the persecution against Catholics.
The Roman Catholic Church in Russia was disintegrating.60
It was the execution of Mgr. Budkiewicz that
created a dramatic increase in denouncing the Soviets
in the Catholic press.

The execution was depicted as

an act of religious persecution in an article in America
on 14 April 1923.

The periodical published Article VII

of the Treaty of Riga from 1921 which supposedly granted
the Roman Catholic Church its legal status in the Soviet
Union.

The commentary suggested that the execution

violated this treaty.

Moreover, the commentary speculated

that possible responses might include some Polish military
action since the treaty was also the peace accord between
Poland and the Soviet Union. 61
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The Catholic press was also eager to report how
the Protestant churches supported the Petrograd clergy.
Quoting from the Methodist periodical, Christian
Advocate, from its 12 April 1923 issue, an article in
America approved the commentary:
It is not for any Protestant to lessen the glory
of these martyrs by saying that they were obedient
to "Rome" rather than to God.
They have been bred
in the belief that the voice that speaks to them
through the Church is the voice of God. And in their
defiance of that Soviet law which offends the dictates of conscience they have displayed a heroism
that links them with all who through the ages have
said: "We know that we ought to obey God rather
than man. " 6 2
Despite this approval of Christian unity, grave
inaccuracies existed in the Catholic press' analysis of
the Soviet system.
printed in America.

Charges of a Jewish conspiracy were
It assessed that:

The Jewish element is trying to gain complete
ascendency in the councils of State.
It is assert~d
that in the event of Lenin's death, Russia will be
ruled by a group of five men.
Form this group the
candidates are Trotzky, Kameneff and Stalin, all Jews
and mentioned as certain to have a place, and Zinoviev,
a Jew, Rykoff, Dzherzhinsky and Krassin.6 3 :
These latent anti-Semitic accusations were typical of the
Catholic C.hurch's unofficial view on the political struc,...
ture of the Soviet Union.

The American Catholic press

also tried to mitigate some of the accusations by denouncing anti-Semitic riots in Poland resulting from the
trial.

The Vatican understood that many of these ethnic

revolutionary Jews were secularized, yet the Church failed
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to convince many of its members in Eastern Europe that
equating Communism with the Jewish religion was a distortion.

The American Catholic ~ress, then, was less

susceptible to making charges of an anti-Semitic
character, yet the European Catholic press was often
less tactful.
Overall, there were two consequences in the
American Catholic community resulting from the trial.
First, its eighteen million members in 1923 would not
support politicians who suggested that the United States
recognize the Soviet government.

Second, the American

Catholic Church emerged from its isolation.

Dialogues

be tween American bishops in both Catholic and Protestant
churches trace their beginnings on unity talks to this
period.

Furthermore, social and charitable Catholic

organizations fraternized with Protestant counterparts .
Although anti-Catholicism was strong throughout the
1920's, the trial created a common cause and a common
enemy for Catholics and Protestants.

Thus, at least

at the hierarchical levels, ecumenism gained momentum
due to the Soviet persecution of religion.

CHAPTER V
THE · FAMINE RELIEF MISSION OF 1921-1924

The American press reported accurately on the
Papal relief mission in the Soviet Union between 1921
and 1924 for several reasons.

First, the mission was

connected to the larger American Relief Administration
directed by the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover
(1874-1964).

This relief organization had its own

public relations and publicity staff which encouraged
American donations.

Moreover, Lenin's government

allowed freedom of communication and transport for
American journalists reporting on famine conditions.
Finally, the head of the Papal mission was from
Georgetown University, the Reverend Edmund Walsh.

He

kept in close touch with American correspondents and
often made appeals to the press when the Soviets hindered his program.
Coverage of the famine reached its peak from
1921 to 1923 in the American secular press.
published six articles during this time.
New Republic printed five articles.

The Nation

Likewise, the

Overall, their

assessments reported the success of the entire relief
effort.

Millions were reportedly saved.

The only un-

certainty was how would the Soviet agricultural policy
56
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rebuild the nation.

The famine was analyzed in the

American secular press as a product of civil war and
drought.

Lenin had shelved the proposed collectiviza-

tion of agriculture for his more pragmatic New Economic
Policy (NEP).

What the Soviets would do after foreign

aid had stabilized the situation remained a point of
speculation in the press.
In comparison, the American Catholic press expressed hope that the Vatican's relief mission might
not only feed the starving Russians, but that it might
help convert the Orthodox masses to Catholicism.

Only

three articles in America, however, appeared because
the hoped for conversions never materialized.

Worse

still in the Catholic press' view, when the Soviets
tried the Petrograd clergy in March 1923, government
officials expressed no gratitude for Catholic donations.
When the Papal mission left the Soviet Union in 1924,
Pope Pius

xr ~

clearly disappointed, lambasted the Soviet

government.64
There were two striking consequences of the Papal
mission revealed in the American press.

First, the

Vatican publicly condemned the Soviet Union as an outcast nation.

This act was si~nificant because, even

after the execution of Mgr~ Budkiewicz in 1923, the Pope
issued no denunciation of the Soviet regime.

Thus, the
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entire Roman Catholic Church was pitted against the
Communist movement.

Compromise was remote.

Secondly,

Edmund Walsh became a leading Catholic spokesman in
America against the Soviet system.

Serving as both

head of the Papal mission and as Papal representative,
he worked closely with Soviet officials whom he came
to regard with utter contempt.

His dual role was

difficult, and there were conflicting goals for Walsh
to somehow build an acceptable modus vivendi.
was not bombastic in his criticism.

Walsh

He studied and

collected virtually ever Soviet publication available in
the West.

Indeed, his collection at Georgetown is con-

sidered one of the best.
The idea of a Papal mission to the Soviet Union
began with Benedict XV.

In 1921, he authorized funds

to go to an international relief organization in Geneva,
Switzerland. 65

As reports further dramatized the disaster,

Benedict XV desired a more direct approach.

Giving food

to the starving Russians could only help the Vatican's
plans to convert the Orthodox, plans well known in the
American Catholic press since 1916.66
The Soviets, leary of the Vatican's designs, allowed
the Pope to attach his mission to the larger American
relief effort under Hoover.

Benedict XV died before the

Soviets issued their final approval, but the next Pope,
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Pius XI, continued to support the mission.

He agreed

with the Soviet stipulation to appoint an American as
the head of the Papal mission.

Walsh accepted the

appointment, and reluctantly agreed to assume responsibility as Papal representative once Archbishop Cieplak
was imprisoned in March 1923.

The Soviets had wanted

a full Papal Nuncio to help lend prestige to their
regime, but they accepted Walsh and the Vatican's relief supplies.
Altogether there were five nations attached to the
American Relief Administration.

The composition of the

Vatican's mission included originally thirteen members.
By nationality there were two Americans, Walsh and Louis
J. Gallagher (1885-1972), Walsh's biographer and fellow
Jesuit,

three Italians, two Czechs, three Germans, two

Spaniards and one Greek.

It was truly international in

character with the members aware of how to conduct
Eastern rite services another Vatican strategy besides
food to attract the Orthodox.
Before Walsh left America, he was director of the
Catholic Apostolic delegation which collected funds
worldwide for the Papal mission.

The amount collected

totaled $750,000, mostly donated by American Catholics. 67
The entire American hierar~hy had conferred in Washington,
D. C.

to organize famine collections.

Such leading
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American Catholics as the Archbishop of New York,
Patrick J. Hayes (1867-1938) organized further fund
drives.

He issued an appeal to his pastors for famine

relief on 20 October 1922.68
The Vatican's mission began operations in
September 1922 in the Crimea.

Walsh organized ninety-

two kitchens in ninety-two villages in one day.

He

expanded the mission to Moscow and Petrograd with the
Soviets' consent.

The maximum development of the

mission occurred between March to September 1923.

By

this time, however, the initial predictions for success
no longer appeared in the American Catholic press.6 9
The Petrograd Catholic clergy trial precluded all the
Vatican's plans to expand the mission.
By late 1923, the Papal mission began experiencing increasingly Soviet interference.

The Pope threat-

ened to recall the mission when the Soviets placed a
secret police agent in its Moscow office. 70

With

Catholic contributions falling sharply after the trial,
1

Pius XI knew that the mission's effectiveness was imperiled.

Added to the loss of revenue, Walsh had

difficulties in negotiating with the Soviets.

He held

them in contempt, and he lacked an adequate staff to
handle the many requests s~nt by the Holy See.
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The Vatican recalled Walsh in December 1923 after
his reports on the imprisoned Archbishop Cieplak, given
to the Western press, raised Soviet demands for his dismissa1.71

The Soviets did not like Walsh's appeals to

public opinion for the Archbishop's release.
liked pressure from -, publicity.

They dis-

Moreover, the Soviets

objected to the elaborate residence in Moscow which
supported the Papal mission.

(See Appendix II)

For

such a residence, the Soviets desired to see an embassy,
not a charitable mission headquarters.

In Walsh's ab-

sence, the Reverend Edward Gehrmann (1888-1960), an
original member of the mission, became the director
until the Soviets expelled the entire staff in 1924
after Lenin's death.
To summarize the Papal mission's significance, it
is important to note that its members worked exclusively
among the Orthodox.

The various Roman Catholic communi-

ties in the Soviet Union were not served by the relief
effort.

Hence, the Soviets were suspicious of the

'Vatican's designs.

They noted that other religious

organizations attached to the American Relief Administration had helped their own denominations.

Baptists,

Methodists and Quakers located their fellow brethren
in the Soviet Union and off~red assistance when it was
needed. 7 2

The Soviets likened the mission's

undertakings
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to the Jes u i ts ' Prose 1 y ti ~~ in g ~ i.n : Russ i a ·:during ·the ·ea .t 1 y
nineteenth century.

The Catholics were seen as oppor-

tunists.
The Soviets were likewise disappointed that an
ambassador did not come with the mission.

Pius XI him-

self encouraged this idea by increasing Walsh's powers
but not allowing any form of recognition~

Thus, the

Soviets concluded that the Vatican only wanted to gain
converts during the famine and ignore the recognition
question.

The Soviets' struggles were seemingly unim-

portant to the Vatican, and after Lenin's death, the
leadership agreed collectively to expel , the Papal mission
as a dangerous counterrevolutionary element.
The American secular press concentrated its coverage mostly on Hoover's efforts and not Soviet complaints.
Reports on the Papal mission usually arose only when
Walsh was having difficulties with Soviet authorities.
Thus, the Papal mission appeared persecuted by Soviet
interference in the secular press.

Moreover, no articles

suggested that the Vatican's representation was opportunistic.

Baptists, Methodists and Quakers all had

members sponsored in the American effort, and they too
supported evangelizing.

Therefore, the secular press

did not see the Soviets' . suspicions as important•
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The Famine appeared as a natural disaster in the
secular press.

No appraisals suggested that the Soviet

agricultural policy was at fault.

Rather, the combina-

tion of drought and civil war seemed responsible.73
The assessments also supported American relief efforts.
A huge grain surplus and a charitable missionary tradition among American churches made famine relief an
acceptable foreign involvement.
Support for American sacrifices continued from
1921 to 1923.

Duririg 1922, the prospects for a more

severe famine saw swift American response.

Meatless and

wheatless days were begun by many American families.
Seemingly the plight of the Russians was becoming a
national, worthy cause.74

What changed the secular

press' analysis was the Petrograd clergy trial in 1923.
Significantly, famine coverage after March 1923
in the secular press offered little encouragement for
further American aid.

Many editors praised past efforts,

but they noted that the Sov i ets appeared ungrateful for
'the vast supplies and money.

The Friends of Russia

issued its Society Relief Work Report in the San Francisco Examiner on 23 August 1923 on page twenty-six.
It represented a typical survey of opinion in the
secular press that past famine relief efforts were
laudatory, but that future aid was no longer a likelihood.
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By 1924, reports of another Soviet famine drew few .
calls in the American public for further action.75
Overall, the secular press reported that the
American relief efforts and the Vatican's attached
mission did save lives in the Soviet Union.

The

Soviet government, ho~ever, gained no sympathy as it
demonstrated little gratitude for the international
assistance.

Moreover, after the famine, the secular

press began examining more thoroughly the Soviet/
Vatican struggle.

The end of famine relief coincided ,

with reports analyzing the validity of the Catholic's
opposition to the Soviet regime.

Thus, the conclusion

of the Papal mission revealed the intense conflict that
actually existed between the Soviets and the Vatican.

CHAPTER VI
THE PRAYER CRUSADE OF 1930
Pope Pius XI's prayer crusade on 19 March 1930
for those Roman Catholics persecuted in the Soviet
Union received broad coverage in the American press.
The accuracy of reporting world reaction and the
nature of the conflict were sound in both the secular
and Catholic press.

Each institution had years of

statistics on the Soviet/Vatican conflict.

Know-

ledgeable commentary came notably from three men:
Walter Duranty, Louis Fischer and Edmund Walsh.

Each

man had studied and assessed in detail the Soviet and
Vatican positions.
A comparison of the Catholic and secular press
in America revealed a striking contrast.

Both Duranty

and Fischer acknowledged Soviet persecution, but they
suggested that the uproar in the Western press was
1

politically encouraged, and that not all of the Vatican's
religious allies were forthright in their facts.

For

example, they portrayed the Anglican Church's accusations as past incidents, ones that occurred during the
Russl· an c 1· v1·1 war.

Walsh, .however, cited Soviet decrees

and statistics from 1929 which revealed the incarceration
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of Catholic priests and the closing of Catholic churches.
All three agreed, however, that the catalyst which
caused the Vatican outrage was the Soviet decree of
8 April 1929 on religion.

The document included over

6,000 words, and it was by far the most comprehensive
series of laws restricting religion.

Basically, there

were eight points outlined by the American secular
press which Western churches opposed.
First, religious organizations lost any legal
status in the Soviet Union.

Second, all churches had

to register with the government or close.
national church could exist.

Third, no

Fourth, no citizens

could join a church until age eighteen, and the congregation had to number at least twenty persons.

Sixth,

material assistance from a church to a member was prohibited.

Seventh, the Soviets banned all religious

or special meetings.

Finally, religious associations,

cults and chapels lost any protection under religious
laws.76
These restrictions culminated in the Soviet
control over religion.

Joseph Stalin (1879-1953)

promoted the laws, yet he stress~d to the Western
press that since the promulgation of Lenin's constitution in February 1918, the Soviets had always intended
to end religion's sway, especially the clergy's power,
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over the masses.

Both Duranty and Fischer agreed with

Stalin's explanation, and they agreed that had Lenin
lived, he would have restricted religion.

The Soviet

decrees, then, appeared as part of the social class
struggle in the Cornmuni st movement.

Furthermore,

Lenin's political philosophy was quoted more directly
in the American secular press than in any of the other
seven events in the Soviet/Vatican conflict.

The fol-

lowing Lenin passage appeared often:
Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression,
lying everywhere on the masses of the people who are
oppressed by eternal work for others ... the helplessness of the exploited classes in their struggle with
the exploiters just as inevitably generates faith in
a better life beyond the grave as the helplessness of
the savage in his struggle with nature produces faith
in gods ... Religion is the opium of the people.77
The significance of quotations like the previous
one revealed that the Soviets defended themselves on
equal terms with the Western churches in the American
secular press.

The Vatican's crusade did not have a

complete hold over a sympathetic public.

Rather, the

Soviet and the Vatican positions were debated, and
cries of persecution no longer generated the overwhelming support of the secular press.
The American secular press questioned critically
the Vatican's charges.

Commentary in the Nation on

5 March 1930 concluded that the "outcry against the
Soviets ... is purely fake. 78
11

Fischer stated further
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that the Holy See's policy toward the Russian Orthodox
Church in Poland was just as harsh as the Soviets' treatment of Catholics in the Soviet Union.

He claimed that

in 1929 the Polish government, with the Vatican's consent,
converted by force over 500 Russian Orthodox churches to
serve as Catholic churches.

Conclusively, Fischer stated

that the Soviet/Vatican negotiations, · conducted sporadically between 1918 and 1927, included plans for the
Catholic Church to supplant the Orthodox Church.
Continued in the same article, Duranty reported
that the religious furor had support from the European
business community.

The growing exports from the Soviet

Union became a menace to the balance of trade, noted
Duranty.

Moreover, he depicted the outcry in England as

part of the To~y political smear against Prime Minister
Ramsay MacDonald who favored Soviet recognition and trade.
The New Republic's commentary concurred with the
Nation's.

It noted that many priests were executed not

because of their religious beliefs but rather for their
' involvement in counterrevolutionary activity.

Also, the

New Republic claimed that the Catholic Church distorted
the figures on church closings.

Of the total 50,000

churches in the Soviet Union, only six percent were
closed reported an article on 5 March 1930.

Moreover,

millions of Russians appeared free to worship privately
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with many displaying icons in their homes.79
Further commentary in the secular press questioned
the Western business community's support for the religious crusade.

It was noted that, although Pius XI, the

Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Bishop William T.
Manning of New York's Anglican Church, the Lutheran
Council and the American Jewish Congress had legitimate
protests, others, indifferent to organized religion,
feared instead the Soviet Five Year Plan.
Many Western economic observers noted how the
Soviets viewed religion and the kulak peasants as a
small-scale capitalist unit.

This system, the Soviets

proclaimed, had to be uprooted because the unit opposed
the collectivization of agriculture and the industrialization of the country.

By subsidizing their industries

and controlling labor costs, the Soviets exported massive
quantities of raw materials at lower than Western market
prices.

In summary, then, the Western business community

supported the religious campaign because economic sanc' tions against the Soviets might ensue with the moral
support of religious leaders. 80
Fischer and Duranty championed the Soviet position
because they desired to expose the economic motives of
the West.

Both men had limited ac~ess to the Soviet

Union, and they admired the progressive, scientific

70

methods of the Communist movement.

They likewise

decried political opportunists using the religious
protests to further the economic isolation of the
Soviets.

Their final analysis concluded that it was

the fear of the Soviets' Five Year Plan and not the
Pope's prayer crusade which motivated many in the West.
The secular press assessed the crusade with the
broadest coverage and commentary of the seven events
which characterized the Soviet/Vatican conflict from
1917 to 1933.

The New York Times carried Pius XI's

letter denouncing the Soviet anti-religious policy.Bl
American Catholics looked for support from Europe, and
they were not disappointed.

Unlike the overwhelming

European support for the Petrograd Catholic clergy in
1923, however, the prayer crusade created a number of
positions.

For example, the reaction of the British press

displayed a variety of opinion.

The Tory Morning Post

supported the Vatican, The Daily Worker was pro-Soviet,
and the Daily Mail urged moderation. 82
French reaction included meetings between Jews and
Protestants in support of the Pope's crusade.

A state-

ment appeared from the French Protestant Federation, the
Russian ~migr~ clergy and the Grand Rabbi of France,
Israel Levi.

This unity was similar to American unity.
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Reaction from Germany included remarks by cardinal
Mi chael von Faulhaber (1869 - 1952) of Munich.

His sermon

of 11 February 1930 was quoted at length by both the
Ne =n York T1'rnes84

an d th e

commonweal. 85

Another promin-

ent Cardinal, Joseph MacRory (1861-1945) of Armagh,
Ireland, also had a sermon published in the Ne w York
Times on 2 March 1930 on page five .

Taken together, the

entire European Catholic community had mo re of its commentary printed in support of the Vatican than in any
of the other seven events.
Other American newspapers concentrated more on
the reaction in the United States.

The Chicago Tribune

did not report the Soviet position and did not carry their
statements to the Western press.
Vatica n's views.
the sit uation .

Rather, it favored the

Thus, it did not objectively analyze
Typi cal coverage concerned sacrilegious

acts such as the destruction of church bells and the
closing of churches reported on 18 Mar c h 1930 on page one.
The newspaper voiced its support for local prot,e sts against
the Soviets, and it encouraged observation of the 19 March
day of prayer.
Reaction from the San Francisco Chronicle blamed
Stalin as the instigator of the anti-religious campaign.
The newspaper outlined his policy on 17 March 1930 on
p age fo u r.

Locally, the edi tor supported such actions
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as the Friends of Russian Freedom Soviety reorganizing
in favor of Pius XI's crusade.

Leo Nicholas Yakovlev

became president of the group which had dissolved itself during the Provisional Government in 1917.

Its

primary task during the crusade was to contact agents
in the Soviet Union and collect evidence on the religious persecutions.
Further reaction in San Francisco included mass
meetings at the Catholic Mission Dolores where Jesuit
Father Victor White spoke against the Soviets.

He

cited American Catholic periodical literature which described how the Pope's call for prayers created a spiritual unity.

White concluded that Soviet persecution

represented a moral danger to the West.8 6
Protests against PiusXI's crusade also received
broad coverage in the secular press.

Mass meetings at

the Bronx Coliseum were reported in detail.

The letter

supporting the Soviets after the protest appeared in the
New York Times.

The American author, Theodor Dreiser,

'was the leading writer.87

The American Communist Party

wanted sympathetic people but non-Communists to make
such public statements as this one, thus trying to demonstrate a broad support.
Significantly, the Soviets rallied their supporters
more effectively in this struggle with the Vatican than in
any of the other events characterizing their conflict.
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They likewise received coverage almost equal to the
supporters of the Vatican.

The Soviet countercampaign

included using prominent Orthodox clergymen.

Metropoli-

tan Sergius (1867-1944) denounced Pius XI, and he denied
reports in the Western press of Soviet persecution.
Reportedly , he had the support of his clergy.

These

clergy, however, held their posts at the behest of the
Soviet government.

Sergius held an interview with mem-

bers of the Western press and recited prepared comments.
The charges presented stated that:
The Pope considers himself the vicar of Christ, but
Christ suffered for the oppressed and downtrodden,
whereas the Pope in his declaration proved himself
to be in the same camp with the English landowners
and the Franco-Italian 'Money-bags. ,88
Sergius claimed further that Pius XI was a warmonger,
and that the Orthodox did not need the prayers or protection of the Catholic Church.

The Pope desired only to

exploit the Orthodox Church, Sergius noted, in order to
extend his authority.

Significantly, no one surmized in

the American press, at the time of the interview, that
Soviet authorities instructed Sergius. The Metropolitan's
remarks were attributed rather as genuine and a reflection of the historical animosity between the Orthodox
Church and the Roman Catholic Church.
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The American Catholic press examined the entire
Soviet anti-religious campaign, but it did not respond
to Sergius' charges which many considered sacrilegious.
In the December 1929 issue of Catholic World, an article
titled,

11

Soviet Anti-God Laws,

decrees.89

11

outlined the 8 April 1929

A detailed report on the condition of Russian

churches also appeared in the Catholic press. It was reported that the international neglect and closing of the
churches threatened the existence of the nearly 1,000
year history of Christian worship in Russia.90

The

practice of 'saving' churches by converting them into
theaters or museums with anti-religious exhibitions was
excoriated as a sacrilegious policy.
Enthusiastic reports appeared in the American
Catholic press on the worldwide reaction favoring Pius XI's
crusade.

An article in the Catholic World titled, "Pro-

tests aganist Soviet war on Religion," noted that the
unity of faiths, begun after the 1923 clergy show trials,
still existed and continued to manifest_ itself.

Awareness

of Soviet persecution was at its height, and the support
from Protestant churches for the Pope was an untold historical event.91
Two critical commentaries on religious conditions
in the Soviet Union appeared in Commonweal.

An article

published on 2 April 1930 on pages 605 and 606 titled,
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"Russia without God," lamented that the sacraments were
no longer dispensed freely.

Births, marriages and

deaths were recorded by civil r e g i s t e r , ~ benefit
of clergy.

Religious processions were banned.

Religious

education, moreover, for children was proscribed, and the
Soviets restricted publication of religious literature.
Only the government press printed Bibles and never an
adequate supply.
Another article in Commonweal titled, "Moscow and
the Churches,'' offered a more objective analysis on the
Soviet anti-religious attitude than any article in the
Catholic press during the 1930 prayer crusade.

The author,

Paul Scheffer, a correspondent for the Berlin Tageblatt
stationed in Moscow until December 1929, wrote the article
when he arrived in Washington,

D.C.

He was not a Catholic, .

but the editors of the Commonweal valued his commentary.
He concluded that religious persecution

had been

"systematically and purposefully carried on since the
creation of the Bolshevist state, even though with vary' ing degrees of severity. 11 92

Scheffer depicted the anti-

religious drive in terms of social struggle.

The Soviets

desired to end the influence of religion and the idea of
private property which Judea-Christian theology and practice supported.

The Soviets, -he concluded, would persist

in their campaign, and pressure was likely to incre~se due
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to the goals set under the Five Year Plan, notably the
collectivization of agriculture and the industrialization
of the country.
Overall, the American Catholic community adopted
without question Pius XI's prayer crusade.

The camapign

squarely placed the Soviet Union as an outcast nation.
As a political doctrine, Communism in practice became
anathema to Roman Catholics.

The Catholic clergy in

America derided the doctrines and ,practices of Communism
with increasing frequency.

Led by Father Walsh's sub-

stantial research and informed commentary, there was no
debate as to whether or not Soviet persecutions were real
or fictitious.

The New York Times carried the most indepth

Walsh commentary in articles from January to March 1930
concerning the Vatican's crusade.93
In summary, the increasing reports on religious
persecution in the Soviet Union found in the American
press greatly reinforced the idea of a Soviet/Vatican
struggle.

In this upheaval, many journalists undertook

'an objective assessment , of the situation.

Facts on the

Russification of the Soviet culture revealed a secularization of society.

The policy of self-determination was

also debated in the press, and more sympathy was accorded
the Soviets than in previous encounters with the Roman
Catholic Church.

One important outcome was that Stalin

77

appeared as the undisputed ruler of the Soviet Union.
The quasi-collegiate leadership after Lenin's death in
1924 no longer remained.

The Catholic press acknowledged

this change by dropping its vague charges that a 'secularized Jewish conspiracy' operated the Soviet government.
Although lambasting the anti-religious policy of
the Soviets was widely accepted in the American press,
a great deal of commentary examined more closely the
Vatican's attitude.

Such journalists as Duranty and

Fischer discounted many of the accusations, and Fischer
went so far as to label the Roman Church an opportunistic
power.

Despite the Pope's crusade, the debate over recog-

nition of the Soviets continued to be raised.

Although

this debate was dampened by the 1930 crusade, the worsening economic depression and a change in the Presidency in
1932 once again brought the question of recognition before
the American public.

CHAPTER VII
THE RECOGNITION DEBATE, 1933
The deba t e concerning the recognition of the
Soviet Union began in earnest during the 1932 presidential campaign.

Father Walsh approved President

Hoover's policy of nonrecognition, and he encouraged
Catholics to support this position.

Walsh analyzed

the Soviets' desire for American recognition in a
14 October 1932 speech before the Civic Federation of
the La wyers'

Club in New York City.

His statements

about the conditions in the Soviet Union were accurate.
He asserted that Soviet finances were in a critical
situation owing to the global depression.

They needed

add i tional capital to achieve the goals of their Five
Year Plan, Walsh noted, and moreover, increased credits
and trade might come with American recognition.

Finally,

Walsh surmized that the specter of famine loomed in the
1

Soviet Union due to the harsh measures of collectivization.

The Soviets needed American grain.94
The missing element in the presidential election,

Wa l s h noted, was t he Democratic party's nominee Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's (1882-1945) attitude on recognition.
Walsh suggeste:El that, if Roosevelt became president·, he
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should set certain conditions if he decided to favor a
recognition policy.

The primary condition in Walsh's

opinion was that the dissolution of the Comintern or
Third International must occur before the United States
accredited an ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Walsh had

the Vatican's support in this matter as Pius XI understood the power of government sponsored propaganda from
the Soviet Union, and the Pope would welcome any help in
silencing it.
After the election and Roosevelt's victory, Walsh
publicly chided members of the United States Senate for
encouraging recognition without stipulations.

He saw their

efforts as a usurpation of presidential authority which
alone should conduct foreign relations with the Senate's
advice and consent.

He objected to certain members taking

a leading role and trying to sway public opinion. 95
It was important that Roosevelt neutralize Walsh's
influence if he were to pursue recognition.

Significantly,

Roman Catholics were a large group in the Democratic co' alition which Roosevelt could not afford to

ignore.

The task of appeasing this group was delicate and complicated since by 1933 the American ·Catholic Church was one
of the strongest and most articulate anti-Communist religious organization due larg~ly to Walsh's influence.
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Since the 1923 Catholic clergy trial in Moscow,
Walsh had been a staunch opponent of recognition.
knowledge of the Soviet Union was substantial.
not a demagogue invoking 'red scare' tactics.

His

He was
Rather, he

took the moral position and cited documented cases of
Soviet religious persecution.

Thus, his opposition on

recognition was a matter to be dealt with seriously.
When Roosevelt announced his intentions to negotiate with Maxim Litvinov (1876-1951), the Soviet Foreign
Minister, he arranged · a meeting with Walsh at the White
House to seek his support.

Walsh concurred with the

President's plan to meet with Litvinov.

He understood

that Roosevelt would ask for the dissolution of the Third
International along with guarantees that Americans could
exercise religious freedom when in the Soviet Union.
Furthermore,

in his own words, Walsh claimed that he

would not oppose subsequent negotiations since he believed
that the ''President should not be embarrassed in the exercise of his constitutional prerogative of conducting
foreign affairs.

11
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When recognition occurred in late November 1933,
however, Walsh waited in vain to learn of the disbanding
of the Comintern.

Not until 1943 would Stalin, out of

requests from the Western Allies, close the organization.
Walsh demanded that recognition be withdrawn since the
\

81

Soviet~ violated their pledge.

For ten years, dating

from his duaJ. appo intment as director of the Papal farnin€
reU_c=f mission and as PapaJ. re presentati·ve in 1923, i~alsh

oppo ,s ed re c ognition because of the power of the Co nin tern I s

propagand a .

He at ated publicly that:

If the Soviet pleads inability to ccnt~ol t he Third
Inter n atio nal , it rnakE:s virtual confes si on t,ha t ther i:>
i s a 1; 0 l i t :i. c:1 l power ,v~.thin its te:c r itori:-d ju.risdict i 011 super i0r to o. nd d omina t ir..g governmen t , hence the
real sovereign .
In that case, the Soviet Government

does not exercise sovereign t y, and the United States
s h o u l d w i th draw· rec can it j_ on a :.1 d treat wi th th ,?. ind :i ca ted ru ler , not wit~ a subordinate. 97
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pre~:: S c:-:_;rnrn.entar y.
r~ d i. t. •.:H ::, c p ~) 0 s e d

The Catholic World and Commonweal

re~ co ~Fl i t i on u n t i l

were ~egotiatee.

s j_ n.c Ei

v a ~-en t
ti. o:-;

1{0 :.1 j_ d

___
Cgmmo1Y-£,r eJ1..-.L
.,

l. ! i.

Jes v. 1 t s we u~ unsure i f form a l

al. J ow t hPm. q rea t0. r
t. i. ~~- ,-:: n s ,

r_·c11e mo s t

t 1. c-n.

Eii t ors of America , however, were ambi-

!TL 2t1.1 y

a E.= Arne-r ~-(.: r.:u 1 c i

.
1.' T,
S

'

')
.•·; ,_

if re coqnitton

or

Lf

•

c.:tc~cess 1n to

'\ y

1 -J.

0

)

- -~

!..

'L

l. .

-..,;- 0 1 .lJ. d

1'__ ~.•• 1,...._ , J
J 11.::. u.

•~~::, ~"-"'fD_
- ~ ll

1 0" ::,,···-~-•

,_.•,_,u
__• ,<:_,·t·- e

.

r e cog n i -

....,
•
t -r .
,,,ov1 e , Ln 1 on

1,.

tll,~

t b e y w o 1.:: l d st Li. 1 f a c E~ per s e c n --·

s·,1ce:inct cc1r:rn(:ntz:.ry

' · 1
w. 1.1 1 c: 1i;_ puJ;
.l
·1

out s t. and i n g pr 0 b 1. e rn s

,::,

.·d- _·r-

,.

c :·:lr•_·ie -r .~ o . :n th f~
+-·. ]·_,---.
_, _;_'.•l
-- 1• ,_--:._ ,..•~

l.~
nftit·r.o ,·'_;' .n _1.,t~
.~,__1__
- '- ·

.··l

9J3 •

,·_n:~
r: stioncd
'

be b12neficiaJ. to the ~n.i.~-.\-::d Sti.1tes ,.

It als o cp.12stio;1 t~C:. ·c·.1,~ m•.Y~:i.vdt:i.on of people and. O.i:ga ni-z :a. t :L Ci!.1 s ·wh i c !J
n~ a E' 0

__l 8

E3 up~'- n rtec.~

r ,2 cc, ~1~1 :L-c. i

·•1 1 .

'There we re i i.ve

J 0 -~·~;. ·r)c·
· -,,...,cl
r· E.-_,,.--..,
cmi t io n .
,,.r ·1/lY i::, l. ) e _c......, ommo ..1 VI~_?-_:.
t · 1 ;::-; .-.:; '-- ~.:.;

82
First, the editors claimed that the Soviets did
not respect the obligations of international law.
Second, no body of laws or judicial system existed in
the Soviet Union to guarantee the protection of the contractual rights of foreigners.

Third, the Soviets

opposed liberty of conscience and the exercise of religious worship.

Fourth, the editors noted the diffi-

culties of the English and French in their diplomatic
relations
grounds,

with the Soviets.

Finally, on largely moral

it was felt that it would be "illogical, stul-

tifying and shameful for the United States to extend
recognition.

11
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The Commonweal also carried Walsh's objections.
The periodical noted the improved trade possibilities
favored by some people should recognition occur, but the
periodical dismissed them as speculation.

It was primar-

ily the moral objection to the Soviets' persecution of
religion that the editors stressed.

They concurred with

Walsh's moral argument and offered this summary.
He is bitterly and unjustly opposed to the war upon
religion, to the suppression of the fundamental rights
of the Christian conscience, which prevail there.
He
believes that if the government of the United States
were to recognize, after fourteen years of silence, a
social order guilty of persecution in the worst sense,
99
the effect would be to endorse spiritual tyranny.
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In its 16 June 1933 issue, the Cornmonweal reported on the 23 April 1933 radio program, "Church
of the Air."

On the program, the issue of trade

relations became the most important angle of the
supporters of recognition.

The editors dismissed

accusations in the secular press after the program
that Catholics were not objective about trade relations.

Being objective, they noted, did not bar

definite conclusions or convictions.

Furthermore,

Catholics had as much right as anyone to warn that
investment in the Soviet Union was too uncertain.100
When addressing the issue of trade, Commonweal
opposed extending credits to the Soviets.

The edi-

tors saw this proposed transaction as too risky, and
they believed that the Soviets would default.

The

editors also noted that propaganda from the Third
International urged that the Communist movement
should overthrow capitalist countries by exploiting
economic benefits from them.

Overall, then, their

assessment doubted that formal recognition would
improve the balance of trade. 1O1
Despite these economic objections, which were
largely speculative, the historical arguments launched
by the Commonweal were accurate and objective.

In its

6 October 1933 issue, the periodical examined A;nerican/
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Russian relations from 1780 to the present.

It concluded

that:
It is obvious that the friendliness displayed in
Russian-American relations for over a century was
not_m~tiva~ed ~y a~y sympathy for the respective
political institutions of either of the two countries.
The reason for this friendliness lies much
d~eper. . !t i~ to be fou~d mainly in the geo-political similarity of Russia and America.102
This was a sound appraisal because in western Asia and
the Pacific, both Russia and the United States sought
to expand their territory and influence.

By 1933,

both were concerned by Japanese expansion in these regions.

Thus,

a Soviet/American rapprochement might

indeed curb any imperialist designs by a third party.
When the Roosevelt/Litvinov meeting was announced,
the Commonweal responded emphatically again that it
opposed recognition.

Taking a moral stance, the editors

assessed the Communist movement in these terms:
It is the growth of militant atheism - of a contagious spirit of the repudiation of all forms of
belief in God - which is more dangerous to the
nations of the western . world, our own among them,
·
·
103
than t~e Red Army of Soviet
Russia.
Sensing that the debate was leaning toward those
favoring recognition, the Commonweal provided a definitive statement on recognition.

Significantly, the ob-

jections raised did not . suggest that Catholics must
withdraw from participating in American politics or in
their support of the Roosevelt administration.

Rather,
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the statement demonstrated the active response of the
Catholic Church which was not in any way divorcing itself from delicate political issues.

The editors de-

clard that:
The Commonweal has over and over again published
its own appeal, and the arguments of other writers,
against the recognition of Russia by this country.
We have considered that the enhanced world prestige which the organized atheism of Russia would
gain by such a formal recognition would be a loss
to religion, and to all forms of civilization
based upon or still influenced by religion, outweighing all the advantages in trade or in the
arena of international politics which the proponents of recognition claim for that policy.104
When recognition occurred, the editors maintained
their moral objections but remained moderate in their
tone.

They appraised the President's actions and con-

cluded that he

11

did what he could and secured reason-

able conditions for civilized human intercourse between
Russia and the United States.

11

l05

The editors also ap-

proved the assurance given by the Soviets that Americans
would be granted liberty of conscience in Russia.
They concluded that the power of the United States would
7

insure Soviet compliance.

The Vatican had likewise set

similar conditions in the Treaty of Riga in 1921 for
Catholics in the Soviet Union only to see them disappear
durin g the show trials of 1923.
In surnmaryj the editors concluded that Roosevelt
would intervene to mitigate for the p~rsecuted.

They

also awaited the announcement of the dissolution of

th

e
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Comintern.

The editors believed, as did Walsh, that

Roosevelt mentioned the condition to Litvinov and that
the Soviets agreed to the stipulation.

There was no

statement in the Commonweal when the dissolution failed
to materialize.
Not surprizingly, the leading American journalist
in the secular press favoring recognition was Fischer.
He wrote several articles for the Nation during 1932
and 1933 on recognition.

His conclusions were almost

opposite the opinions in the Catholic press.

Fischer

assessed that Communist propaganda had no significant
impact in America.

Furthermore, he claimed that the

Comintern no longer posed the threat of revolution in
capitalist nations as it did in 1919.

Europe was no

longer economically and politically devastated from
World War I, noted Fischer, and the Soviets were stable
and powerful, thus, unlikely to want revolutions occuring in countries it needed as trading partners.
excoriated the
1

He

'red scare' tactics used by opponents

of rec o g nit ion and de c 1 are d that " Communism in the
United States is a minor movement which demagogues use
as a bogy to frighten the stupid and attain their own
ends."106
Not all of Fischer's assessments diverged from
the Commonweal's appraisals.

He too agreed that Japanese

expansion caused alarm in the U.S. and the u.s ; s.R.
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An alliance might thwart the imperialist designs of
Japan especially in China, noted Fischer.
praisal was Fischer's main point.

This ap-

He saw the rise of

Japan as the most important reason for recognition, concluding that the U.S. needed to protect its Pacific
interests.
Fischer was less gracious in criticizing the
opponents of recognition. He derided Hoover's nonrecognition policy, claiming that the former President's
"innate conservatism" and "imperialist tendencies"
prevented him from viewing the Soviets pragmatically. 107
Fischer also speculated that Hoover's vanity was
wounded when the Soviets failed to show sufficient
gratitude for American relief during the famine in the
early 1920's.

Significantly, these charges were the

same ones Fischer leveled at the Vatican during its
struggle with the Soviets especially during Pius XI's
1930 prayer crusade.
The editor of the Nation supported Fischer's
1

•

•

v1ewpo1nt.

Oswald Garrison Villard (1872-1949) favored

the improved trade possibilities that recognition would
,.

incur.

He disregarded much of the ~estern churches'

polemi cs against the Soviets, and he sarcastically
dubbed the Bolsheviks as "the would be destroyers of
the sacred Christian religion." 108

v{11ard believed

88
that the churches were too vociferous in their attack.
Their charges created the threat of a Communist menace
which fueled in turn a backlash and gave rise to such
men as Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) in Germany.

Conclu-

sively, he felt that the religious counterpropaganda
was unnecessary and potentially dangerous.

Villard

believed that equa~ing Communism with the entire political left's social agenda caused a polarization, and
one outcome was that people supported positions of the
extreme right as their salvation rather than seeking a
moderate consensus of progressive reforms.
Compared to the Catholic press' assessment, the
secular press viewed recognition in more pragmatic
and not moral terms.

The economic benefits from recog-

nition were considered more obtainable by both the
Nat ion and the New Republic than by the Cornrnon-·weal.
In its 29 November 1933 issue, the New Republic pub1 i shed an article titled,
Hands.

11

109

11

Russia and America. Strike

In its cornrnen tary, it recalled that it

had favored recognition almost from the beginning of
the Soviet Union's existence.

Increased trade gained

by the rapprochement could only help abate the economic

ills in America.

Moreover the war debt questioned

proved an outdated issue as the Allies' debt was largely
cancelled, why not Russia's, declar-ed the article•
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The article approved the Soviets' pledge to end
the Third International and cease all revolution propaganda.

It cited also that ''the great campaign for

religious freedom for foreigners in Russia ... turns
out to have been painfully unnecessary.

11
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This

judgement came after Litvinov read a host of Soviet
decrees and laws allowing the exercise of religious
expression in the Soviet Union to the western press.
What the New Republic failed to note was the costs to
individuals who chose to exercise their religious
rights.
The periodical favored an American/Soviet understanding because Germany and Japan became further isolated.

The danger of war seemed averted because the two

largest land powers, the U.S. and the u.s.s.R. sought
common ground.

Part of the formal recognition might

entail discussions on curbing Japanese expansion in Asia
and the Pacific and German threats to redraw the map of
Eastern Europe.
In conclusion, the overall coverage on the recognition debate revealed two distinct opinions.
the Catholic press raised moral objections.

First,
The sta-

tistics on persecution were there, and it looked unlikely
that _Joseph Stalin would honor the religious freedoms
outlined in Lenin's 1918 constitution or the Treaty of

90
Riga.

Second, the secular press took a more pragmatic

view.

The Soviets were a world power, and recognition

would benefit America in terms of trade and checking
the expansion of Germany and Japan.

The secular press

discounted the moral objections of the churches as
early as the prayer crusade of 1930.

The Catholic press

discounted the envisioned trade surplus.

The only area

of agreement was that the dissolution of the Third
International would ease concern over Soviet calls for
world revolution.

The virulent propaganda was disliked

and feared in the West, thus its end would create a
calmer, more rational climate for mutual relations.
Only the Catholic press lamented when the Soviets
failed to close the Comintern.

CO n Cl lJ.S i On

Although ending this study in 1933 may seem
arbitrary, there are sound reasons for selecting this
date.

With the recognition question settled in 1933,

America began a new chapter in its relations with the
Soviets.

The Vatican adapted to this new circumstance,

and Pius XI encouraged the American Catholic hierarchy
to have the U.S. government intercede on behalf of the
persecuted in the Soviet Union. Stalin had virtually
consolidated the state's power over the Roman Catholic
Church in 1933, and he saw little need to increase any
restrictions.

Also, the rise of Hitler and his concordat

with the Vatican moved the Church further away from a
modus vivendi with the Soviets.
Significantly, the seven events which characterized
the Soviet/Vatican conflict in the American press did not
always reveal the animosity between the two powers.

The

two 1917 revolutions seemed to offer a unique opportunity
to expand Catholicism.

The Genoa Conference and to some

extent the Papal famine relief mission also reportedly
created favorable contacts whereby a concordat might ensue.

It was not until the 1923 Petrograd clergy trial

that the Soviets and the Vatican appeared as irreconcilable
parties.
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After examining American opinion on the Soviet/
Vatican conflict from 1917 to 1933, six important consequences are discernible.

First, the Roman Catholic

Church emerged as the staunchest religious opponent of
the Communist movement.

Pope Pius XI became a leading

opposition figure which was significant for several
reasons.

To begin with, although the Catholic Church

suffered under the Soviets, the losses incurred in no
way compared to the huge sacrifices made by the Russian
Orthodox Church.

Indeed, the Orthodox clergy led by

Patriarch Tikhon failed to unite against the Soviets.
Tikhon's successor, Metropolitan Sergius, avoided confrontation and sought a rapprochement with Stalin.
Finally, the emigre clergy in Europe and North and South
America failed to agree on whether to support Sergius or
oppose the modus vivendi.

Thus, the Orthodox Church,

which had substantial reasons for denouncing the Soviets,
abdicated its role to the more organized and wordly Holy
See.
Another noticeable consequence arising from the
Soviet/Vatican conflict was the growing ecumenical movement in America.

Leading bishops and rabbis from

Protestant and Jewish churches agreed with the Pope that
Communism threatened religious liberty.

This common cause/

common enemy approach was unique in the U.S.

Catholics

in Poland and the Baltic states failed to unite with th e
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Eastern Orthodox in defying the Soviets.

Instead,

Catholic officials in Poland seized Orthodox churches
in the Belorussian and Ukrainian territories won in the
1919-1921 Soviet/Polish war.

Many Catholics in Eastern

Europe also believed that the Jews were responsible for
the spread of the Bolshevik armies, thus no one sought
Jewish support in protesting Soviet atrocities.

Only

in America did substantial dialogue among the various
churches arise from the perceived Soviet threat.
Perhaps the most devastating consequence from the
Vatican's disapproval of the Soviets was the antiSemitic accusations raised by the Church in defining
Communism.

Commentary in the Jesuit periodical America

made many claims of a Bolshevist/Jewish conspiracy.
For its part, the Holy See did little to enlighten
Catholics that Bolsheviks who were ethnic Jews were also
completely secularized.

This distortion was partially

responsible for the Holocaust because many Catholics in
Eastern Europe remained indifferent to the plight of the
Jews during World War II.
Indifference to the Jews' plight was likewise
noticeable in the American Catholic Church.

No promin-

ent Catholic leader objected to the American immigration quotas for Jews when evidence from Nazi Germany in
· per1·1 ·
the 1930's suggested that t h ey were 1n

American
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Catholic radio commentators repeated, rather, the belief
that a Bolshevik-Jewish plot threatened Europe, and that
Hitler stood as a defender of the West.
Because the previous legacy was inconsistent
with what Church leaders knew, the failure of the Holy
See to dispel the Bolshevik-Jewish conspiracy myth cost
many lives.

Ignorance was not an excuse.

The study of

the Soviets had become a priority of the Holy See.

The

Russicum Collegium in Rome and the School , for Foreign
Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.
were but two institutions where the Church trained its
clergy about the Soviets.

The extensive collections on

the Soviets should have made clear to Catholic scholars
that the Jews were in no way responsible for the rise
of Communism.

Thus, although the Catholic Church pro-

moted the indepth study of the Soviet Union, Catholic
scholars failed to discount the Bolshevik-Jewish conspiracy
myth.
The last two consequences are related.

Because of

, the Soviet/Vatican struggle, American Catholics emerged
from their exclusiveness, and they became a strong political force.

Despite the resurgence in anti-Catholicism

during the 1920's, Catholic leaders expanded missions and
charitable foundations in the U.S.

Catholic leaders en-

couraged their fellow members to unite with other
Christians in opposing the Communist movement.

Hence,
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Catholics became moral leaders.

Roman Catholics had

also become an important part of the Democratic party
coalition in 1932.

Although their efforts to block the

recognition of Soviet Russia failed, their opinion was
not ignored.

Catholic leaders received invitations to

the White House, and they were briefed by President
Roosevelt.

They were part of the establishment and no

longer considered outsiders in a predominantly Protestant
America.
Overall, then, American opinion on the first sixteen
years of the Soviet/Vatican struggle saw the Catholic
Church emerge as the defender of religious liberty and a
staunch opponent of the political left.

The Holy See was

successful in creating for itself a moral leadership role
against the spread of Communism.

By emphasizing the im-

portance of traditional values, the Vatican became a more
tolerable symbol in America.

The moral authority of the

Pope became respected as he undertook the task of articulating against the Soviets.

In America, then, Catholics

' began to enjoy an increased stature due in part to their
united front against the spread of Communism.
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APPENDIX I
WALSH TO CREEDEN, 27 SEPTEMBER 1923
Your very welcome letter of August 18 reached rn e
to d a Y r ; : Pt; rn be r . ~ 7_, a~~ ~ ~ ~n h u r r ~ i n g . t. o g- et a f e 1·l 1 i n e s
to you ~y tne nex~ ~cour1er ~no lea~ es 1n a few hou rs for
Warsaw.
I do not trust the Russian post, as the few
.l e t t e r s 1·i hi ch have come th a t w 2. y bear c 1 ear s i g 11 s O f h a v _
i D. g b e 2 !':. 0 p en '2 d 2 :!1 C. re 3. d by t 1-J. e " G . ? . lJ .
Bo l '.3 !1 C' .,_r i ]<: ,_ e: . :- e
Po lic e).
Hence w·e send th e mail to Vatican by courie r 2. nd
it is pos ted from the Vatican.
That is why t~e time is s
l ong .
As you can re2dily i1nag ine, I was delight ed to h a.vi_
the j_e t i_· -,.::c ',·.' i th the very intimate new s of things Arn er j_ c 2. n
esp e c i 2..:i. l y For e i g n Se rvi c e n e 1·t s .
. . . I have b een t .r y i n g
rn y be s t t o g e t back but the Vat i can does not s e e rn t o 1·/ a n. t
to let rne go yet . I was in Rome in J·uJ.y 2nd made tent ative 2r ra.ngeme nts to f i nish as :.r non as possible and get.
back to the U.S.A. But despite the promise which the
Ho ly Fathc~r ma de himself, i.e . t.o appoint a Bisho p or
Apostol i c Delegate who would take over the ha lf hundred
different jobs I h ave been holding here , nothing ha s be en
done yet . Until th a t is done , I cannot hold out rnuc}1
hope.
As y ou may suspect, relief work for the starvin g forms
but a small fraction of my Kork at present, the chi ef occup~tions being rather those of an unofficial r ep r ese nt ative of the Va tican in dealings with the Soviet goverrn~ e nt .
At present the Holy See is negotiating the liberatio n of
Archbishop Cieplak and some 22 Catholic priests impris oned
by the Bolshe viks, and until that is successfully accom But i t
p lished, I know th e y want me to kee~ on the job.
is a continual penance of the most pronounced type as th e
Bolsheviks ar e the lowest type o f humanity I can imagin e .
I have been ins tr ucted by the Holy See td keep up the usua l diplomatic fo rm in dealing with them but I assur e you
it is like casting the proverbial pearls before swin e . I
shall have much t o tell yo u wh en I return which one does
not commit to p ape r in Russia .
I have ju st succeed e d in obtaining one thing which
the Vatican wanted. When the Bolsheviks were driven back
from Poland two years ago they b rought many treasure s
from robbed church es . Among other things they desecrat ed
th e relics of Blessed Andrew Bobola (o f th e Society) whi c~
11
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(
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we re highly venerated in Poland.
They brought the
r e-i= lics
to
Moscow
and
have
them
on
exhibi't 1· 011 a s a so rt
,- _. , •
.c
•
□ L. ~~01c~le OL holy things.
I have just succeeded in
ge-c.t.1ng them away from the m and am sending the t t l
v,-1· ... ,
m·
B - h
. ~ _
.
, rn o , 1e
~ L, =L a. n .
~he 0.1s _ev1Ls !12d 2..1ways refus e d the r equ e st
or G~e Po~1sh.gove~nment_ b ut I have been able . to pers u~ : ~ L~em to g1 ve tn~. ~el 1c,s to . the Va ti can. Th e y h ave
a~~ee~, . on G~ e con~~t~on tnat 1n transporting th e m to
Rort1 e .1 oo no1.., p e r m1r, "Chern to p a ss through Polish t erri t or y .
So I 2 m sending P. Gallagher with thern to Od e ss a ,
t h e nc e by Bla c k Se ~ to Constantinople and thenc e to
Brindisi in I t aly .
.
_ In_ord~r to procure the release of Archbishop
C:i. E:p i. ak it w1ll Le necE:ssc.ry tog-et certain Communi sts
in e x change, i.e., Communists held by various gove~nrnen t s abroad.
So ·we are treating at pres e nt with t wo
c;;f ove r n rnents, and when that is su cc essru.lly f ini s l1 ed , r
h o pe I will 0 e one step n e arer home and For e ign Servic e .
In th e process of reo r ganizing the Po n tific al
Pe li e f Missi o n, I have jus t taken over a ne w hous e th a t
h a d be e n ha l f ·wr e ck e d du r i n g the Rev o l u t i o 11 a nd a rn en -ga ged in r e storing it.
After digging the bull e ts o u t
of the wall and plastering up shell holes on th e ou ts i de ,
a s well a s spending about $10 ,000 in gener a l rep a i rs ,
the Ho ly See now has a Moscow headquarters not i n fe r i o r
t o a ny foreign Mission in Moscow.
. .. In thi s new hou se ,
once one of the great rnc:1.nsions of r-Ioscow a nd ab ou t a s big
a s t h2 Ol d North Building, 1 shall hold forth i n pap a J.
.s plen d or.
I have a suit of 7 rooms , and with Ca lla gh .r
a b out to l eave for good next We dnesday, I shal l b e a l on e .
My of f ice is about as big a s the Riggs annex. With one
pr iv a t e secretary, two typists , a cook, housekeep e r, a n d
o n e maid, I will try to worry along in the vita secu laris
which we live here among t he Bolsheviks . There is not another S.J. within a thousand miles.
To this off ice are now being r e ferred all questio ns
between the Vatican and the Soviets, questions which a r e
daily increasing as the Vatican is endeavoring to reo rg a nize and save the chuiches after the storm of the Revolu ·tion and ihe present equally destructive ieligious oppr ession of the Bolsheviks.
Vera est persecutio et diobo l ic a .
For that reason the Vatican videtur velle potius Americ anurn ut legaturn suurn.
P. Maas and the General w~re conc erned when I was in Rome in July as it looked as 1f th e
Vatican · were seriously thinking of naming E.A.W. Epi s c opu m
vel Delegaturn Aposto licurn (Episcoplern) in Russia.
~ h ad
a lona audience with the Holy Father on the whole s1tu ati;n,~one hour and thirty minutes, and He promised to
.L
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appoint a Bishop o r o ther representative within the
next week or so.
But now almost three months have
passed and nobody has shown up and as a result the old
fears are beginning to be felt that the Vatican may
say that E.A.W. has been there almost two years and
knows the situation etc. These are not vain fears, nor
what Shvne would call B. S.
but hard facts. The onl v
thing t~ do is to npull a bone 11 at once.
..
11

11

I understand_ all you write about Foreign Servic e
. .. I will certainly make a de terillined effor t to settle u ~ the Vatican affairs h e rG in
time to get back by second term if humanl y possible. I
have never asked to be relieved as so many have failed
on this Ru ssian mission th a.t I could not in conscience
a dd another to the embarrassments of the Vatican.
But
at the first indication that the job is done, I will be
on my -. .-1ay . ( 11 The Rev . Edmund _A. Wals h , _ s-. J ~ , Papers , 11
Box 2 Folder 94, Special Collections Div i sion,
G~orgetown University Library.)
2n d am very uneasy .
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